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ABSTRACT

There is a fierce controversy being waged today about the status of the
historic dual banking system in American law. National banks (banks chartered by
the national government) derive their powers from federal law. States, on the other
hand, assert that they should be able to control certain aspects of national bank
operations such as consumer protection written as state law. While the national
banks acknowledge that states do have certain areas where they may control
national bank activities-much contract law, for example, which is essentially state
law-the national banks also assert a high level of authority-preemption-over
the states where both national and state law have application.
States assert that the degree of preemption claimed by the national banks is
excessive. Our paper makes the point that this conflict is almost inevitable, given
the existence of national and state banks operating in the same areas. The point of
the paper is that the controversy has nothing to do with the so-called dual banking
system and calling upon the name of the system to support either national or state
bank authority is misleading and adds nothing to the argument.
The paper goes on, however, and asserts that, given recent changes in both
national and state law, the dual banking system does not exist at all in any
meaningful way and resort to it clouds rather than illuminates the underlying
conflict. The authors believe that national and state banks are really no more
different from one another than are two national (or two state) banks.
Statutes like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 and the state "blue sky" laws are discussed in this context.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Argument
There is a fight being waged between two armies on the status of banks in
the federal system. Given the nature and clarity of the argument, it is reminiscent
of Matthew Arnold's presence "on a darkling plain/Swept with confused alarms of
struggle and flight." We know that the dispute has something to do with the "dual
banking system", generally described as a system composed of banks with federal
charters ("national" banks) contrasted with state chartered banks. It is in relating
the dual banking system to the fight that we encounter the famous darkling plain.
As to the state chartered banks, they do not enter into the fight and insofar as
the position taken in this article is concerned, there should be little or no dispute
where state banks are concerned. They are chartered by state law but, as we shall
see, 2 their completely neutral status is somewhat muddied by the fact that federal
law plays no small part in their power structure. Since, however, the Comptroller
of the Currency, chief administrator of national banks, lays no jurisdictional claim
' MATTHEW ARNOLD, Dover Beach and Other Poems 86 (Dover Publications 1994) (1867),
availableat http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/arnold/writings/doverbeach.html.
See infra Chapter IV.
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to the state banks and they take no part in the preemption argument that is the
essence of the fight, they lie largely outside its penumbra.
The fight is over national banks alone and how jurisdiction over them shall
be divided between the federal and the state governments. 3 We believe and assert
in this article that there is no meaningful dual banking system; this in part explains
the absence of state banks from the underlying dispute. But whether there is or is
not, the fight between federal and state governments over national banks would
exist because both want that jurisdiction in some measure. It is part of our position
that assertions often randomly made about the dual banking system have no real
relevance to the fight between the two governments. Both are looking for
jurisdiction over national banks. We can divide that jurisdiction in different ways.
But nothing depends upon the existence of the dual banking system.
A paper written by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the
dispute has as its first sentence (also first paragraph) the following:
Today, the dual banking system, which has been a hallmark of banking in the
United States for nearly 200 years, is under attack, as many states have attempted to
assert legislative and enforcement authority over national banks in a way that
contradicts constitutional principles that have been well-settled since the early
4
nineteenth century.

About this quotation, we would say: (i) the dual banking system is illusory,
so it is hardly under attack; (ii) it had been a hallmark of banking in the United
States, but is no longer; and, (iii) states are attempting to assert authority over
national banks, but this is not new and has nothing to do with the historic dual
banking system.
B. State Controls over NationalBanks
The present controversy may not unfairly be said to date to January 13, 2004,
when the Comptroller issued a set of regulations.5 Those regulations dealt with
two issues:
1. The extent to which federal law preempted state law for national banks.
As we shall discuss, 6 one cannot be precise about this power division between state
and nation. Any activity may fall on either side of the line. Only certain principles
of construction can be given. There really was nothing new in the Comptroller's

See Erin Davis & Tara Rice, Federal Preemption of State Bank Regulation: A Conference Panel
Summary, Chicago Fed Letter, Essays on Issues, The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, September
2006, Number 230a at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflseptember2006_230a.pdf.
The state position is asserted by state attorneys general, state bank regulators and state consumer
groups. The last of these believes that consumers will be better protected if they are represented by
state interests than if by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, NATIONAL BANKS

AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM (2003), availableat http://www.occ.treas.gov/DualBanking.pdf.
s Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (January 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12

C.F.R. pt. 7).

6 See infra Chapter
VI.
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regulations.7
2. The extent to which state authorities have visitorial powers over national
banks in such areas as authority to examine and review books and to use the courts
to deal with perceived violations of law.8 As with application of law generally, the
regulation specifies certain areas where state authorities do have such visitorial
powers. 9 Again, the power given to the Comptroller is not absolute; it is at one end
of a spectrum with the states exercising power at the other end. One must always
determine where the particular power at issue falls. This aspect of the regulations
did lay down a rule somewhat harsher than what had been generally accepted
previously: the visitorial authority of the states was deemed minor compared to
that of the Comptroller.
C. If There Were No State Banking System
If, however, there were no state bank-that is, no possibility of a dual
banking system-it is most probable that the dispute over the degree and form of
state intrusion into the national banks would be essentially unchanged from what it
is today: state interests would assert jurisdiction over the banks up to a line of
uncertain specificity and the federal interests would dispute this jurisdiction
beyond a line of their own choosing.
The controversy has been most visible recently in the United States Supreme
Court where an opinion affirmed the preemptive supremacy of a subsidiary of a
national bank against powers being asserted by the Michigan State Office of
Insurance and Financial Services.10 The majority opinion quite correctly did not
mention the dual banking system" because, as we assert, dual banking has nothing
to do with preemption and supremacy. The dissent does deal with dual banking
over the course of several pages but the place of dual banking in its argument is
unclear. The dissent does make the following points:

The standard for preemption adopted by the Comptroller in its final rule was intended to be
"distillation of the various preemption constructs articulated by the Supreme Court." Bank Activities
and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1910 (January 13, 2004) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34). An earlier verbalization in a proposed rule was criticized by
commentators as being a broader preemptive standard than that previously articulated by the Court. See
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 46119 (August 5,
2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
8 A part of the Comptroller's regulation, designated 12 C.F.R. § 7.40000(a)(2), identifies the
following activities as examples of state "visitorial powers" accepted by the Comptroller:
(i) Examination of a bank;
(ii) Inspection of a bank's books and records;
(iii) Regulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to
federal banking law; and,
(iv) Enforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning
those activities.
See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b). Included with other authorities given to states is the duty to
functionally regulate "insurance activities of any person (including a national bank ...)" as granted in
§301 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub.L.106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, November 12, 1999.
In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
" Except in a footnote where it corrected a mistake about dual banking made by the dissent. We
deal with this at note 13, infra.
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First, "the dual banking system's main virtue is its divergent treatment of
national and state banks." 12 As we point out below, the enactment of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) 13, and the
forty-seven state 'wild card' statutes have forced national and state banks into
essential legal identity. The Scott article cited in the dissent as support for its
assertion was published in 1978, well before enactment of FDICIA and almost all
the wild card statutes. 14
Second, "state law must usually govern the activities of both national and
state banks." 15 Under FDICIA, state law cannot govern state banks and must give
way to federal law.
Third, "[t]he policy of competitive equality is ... firmly embedded in the
statutes governing the national banking system."1 6 It is fundamental banking law
that the federal policy of competitive equality is applicable only to branch banking.
The majority decision observes this in footnote seven. As to more general
banking, "National banks have been National favorites." 17
Fourth, "the dual banking system has remained intact."1 8 It has not.
FDICIA and the wild card statutes have altered it in pronounced ways.
It is worthy of note that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit from which the appeal to the Supreme Court was taken1 9-which also
affirms the superior standing of the Comptroller-makes no mention of the dual
banking system in setting the line of division between federal and state authority.
(Actually, the line would fall in different places depending upon the particular area
of law under discussion/dispute.) We maintain that the dual banking system,
despite protestations about it, simply does not advance the argument.
D. A Proposalforthe De-Jure End ofDual Banking
Our argument is premised upon the essential irrelevance of the state banking
system as it is now constituted to considerations of preemption. We propose that,
in the interest of efficiency and economy, the remnants of the dual banking
system--or, as more honestly put, the state banks-be eliminated.
II.

A BRIEF

HISTORY OF THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM

Historically, the Bank of North America, 20 chartered by the Second
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. I (2007).
'3 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105
Stat. 2236.
14 See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REv. 1, 8-13 (1977) (explaining the perceived benefits of the dual banking system).
's Watters, 550 U.S. at 42.
12

16 Id. at 43.

" Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1976).
18 Watters, 550 U.S. at 43.
" Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 550 U.S. I (2007).
20In 1787, the Bank of North America changed to a Pennsylvania Charter following controversy
about the legality of a congressional charter.
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Continental Congress in 1781, is acknowledged as the first significant bank
chartered by the United States government. Before creation of the Bank of North
America, other banks such as the Bank of Pennsylvania existed; however such
banks were chartered by individual states. 21
In the early 1780's, state chartered banks began mainly issuing paper money
("bank notes") in addition to coinage already in circulation. These bank notes
assisted greatly in the expansion of U.S. commerce. Further, these state chartered
banks were allowed to effectuate "traditional" bank activities, such as accepting
deposits and making loans. 22 Bank notes were secured by the assets of the issuing
bank 23 in the way more typical of business loans.
However, banks were effectively prevented from extending loans if
customers refused to accept their notes. The acceptance of banks' notes was
usually decided based on the banks' records in exchanging their notes for specietypically coins-when called upon by their customers.
During the late 18th Century, U.S. banks were largely "supervised" by the
market. Gradually, the banking system transformed into a dual structure. Those
banks which sought to put bank notes in the market place normally sought for a
charter from either state or federal authorities.
In order to finance the American Revolution, Congress printed the new
country's first paper money. This paper money, known as "continentals", was
issued in high quantity which had an attendant inflationary effect. Initially, the
resulting inflation seemed relatively mild. However, inflation became more
problematic by the time of the Civil War.24
A. Creation and Closing of the Firstand Second NationalBanks
The history of U.S. banking at the federal level starts with the creation of the
First and Second Banks of the United States (the "Bank" or "Banks"). In 1971
Congress chartered, and President Washington subsequently approved, the First
Bank of the United States. Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of Treasury, played a
significant role in drafting the Bank's charter, modeling it after the charter of the
Bank of England.
Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, thought that the Bank was
"unconstitutional", arguing that the Bank obtained an "unauthorized" extension of
federal authority. He stressed the idea that Congress maintained solely delegated

21

See Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation:Of Banks, Corporate

Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49 Buff. L. Rev. 1011, 1020 (2001).
22 See Bray Hammond, "Banks and Politics in America," Princeton University Press 1957, at 14445.
23 Unlike today, at that time, banks were not required to maintain any minimum reserve
requirement. In the early 1800's, New York State developed the "safety fund system". Under the
system, every member bank contributed a small percentage of its capital annually to a state managed
fund. The aim was to protect note-holders in the event of bank collapse. In 1842, Louisiana followed
suit, by enacting legislation limiting the number of banks and requiring them to maintain one third (1/3)
of their assets in cash and two-third (2/3) in short-term obligations.
24 Paper money has little or no intrinsic value as a commodity, it is costless to produce, usually
taking the form of tokens or pieces of paper; and was not redeemable for any commodity.
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authority, clearly provided in the United States Constitution. According to
Jefferson, the only basis in the Constitution for chartering the Bank was set forth in
the "necessary and proper" clause. 25
Another dissenter, James Madison, stated that the First Bank of the United
States was:
[C]ondemned by the silence of the Constitution; was condemned by the rule of
interpretation arising out of the Constitution; was condemned by its tendency to
destroy the main characteristic of the Constitution; was condemned by the
expositions of the friends of the Constitution whilst depending before the public;
was condemned by the apparent intentions of the parties which ratified the
Constitution; was condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by
26
Congress themselves to the Constitution.

Although Hamilton acknowledged that the Constitution was silent with
respect to regulation of the banking system, he argued that Congress had the
authority to borrow money, tax, and regulate interstate and foreign commerce.
Therefore, he argued the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution,
granted Congress the authority to pass any act necessary to carry out its authorities.
President Washington supported the Hamiltonian rationale. 27 The First Bank of
the United States headquartered in Philadelphia, was granted a charter of twenty
28
years. The Secretary of the Treasury supervised the Bank.
At that time, the Bank was almost the largest business entity in the United
States. 29 Among other things, it served as a repository of government funds; a
source of loans for individuals and the federal and state governments; was
responsible for control of the money supply by regulating the amount of notes state
banks could issue, and the transfer of reserves across the country; and acted as a de
facto depository of the Treasury's funds. 30 The Bank fiercely competed with state
banks in the business of money lending and as a depository. State banks
considered such competition unfair as the Bank, in addition to providing banking
31
services, also regulated banking activities.
Gradually, the Bank expanded its activities in major banking transactions
and money interests. Such expansion was not welcomed by many people who
32
became uncomfortable with the concept of a large and powerful "central bank".
Twenty percent (or one-fifth) of the First Bank of the United States' stock was
owned by the government and the remaining eighty percent of the Bank's stock

25 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
26 See Ken Robinson, Senior Economist and Policy Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,

Address at Economic Summit 2004 (June 8, 2004) (quoting James Madison), available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/educate/events/2004/04ecsummit-robinson.pdf.
2' See GERALD T. DUNNE, MONETARY DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1960)

26 See First Bank
of the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FirstBank-of the UnitedStates.
29 See The Founding of the Fed - Federal Reserve Bank of New York, http://www.newyorkfed.
org/aboutthefed/historyarticle.html.
30 See First Bank of the United States, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h443.htmi.
31 Id.
32 See FED101 - History, http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/fedI01/history.
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was owned by private investors. 33 Interestingly, the U.S. government borrowed
money from the Bank in order to purchase the stock. Private investors were
required to use government bonds to pay seventy-five percent of their stock
subscription prices in the Bank. Accordingly, a large percentage of the Bank's
capital was guaranteed by some form of government obligation.34
The First Bank of the United States was capitalized at $10 million, which
was divided into 25,000 shares of voting stock with a par value of $400 per
share.3 5 The Bank mandated a thirty share limit per individual. 36 Interestingly, the
Bank permitted foreigners to buy shares in the Bank; however, they did not have
voting rights. 37 The First Bank of the United States maintained significant
For instance, in 1809 the Bank's specie (banknote) ratio was
liquidity.
approximately forty percent in comparison to a modern average reserve (deposit)
ratio of close to twelve percent. 38 Accordingly, the Bank was one of the most
liquid banks in the country. 39 The Bank was also remarkably profitable. Most of
its income was earned by way of loans and the funding of other banks, which
required temporary liquidity. 40
Various historians regard the First Bank of the United States as a success.
For example, Treasury Secretary Gallatin 41 stated that the Bank was "wisely and
skillfully managed". 42
During the life of the First Bank of the United States, state banks
substantially increased the number of bank notes in circulation. 43 Describing that
period, John K. Galbraith writes that "State banks, relieved of the burden of forced
redemption [imposed by the First Bank], were now chartered with abandon; every
location large enough to have a church, a tavern, or a blacksmith shop was deemed
a suitable place for setting up a bank. These banks issued notes, and other, more
surprising enterprises, imitating the banks, did it likewise. Even barbers and
bartenders competed with banks in this respect." 44
Effects of the war with England added to the high inflation during 1812 -

3 Id.
34

See

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, NATIONAL

THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM (2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
DualBanking.pdf.
3 See David J. Cowen, The First Bank of the United States and the Securities Market Crash of
1792, 60 J. EcON. HIST. 1041,1041-60 (2000).
36 See H. Wayne Morgan, The Origins and Establishment of the First Bank of the United States, 30
Bus. HIST. REV. 472, 472-92 (1956).
BANKS

n

AND

See THIBAUT DE SAINT PALLE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE -

AN INTERNATIONAL MYSTERY 43

(1984).
3 See History of Central Banking in the United States, http://facultate.regielive.ro/referate/
engleza/history of central banking-in the united states-I l038.html.
3 Id.
40 Id.
4' Albert Gallatin served as Secretary of Treasury from 1801 until 1814.
42 See WILLIAM F. HIXON, TRIUMPH OF THE BANKERS: MONEY AND BANKING IN THE EIGHTEENTH
AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 114(1993)

43 See banking: Definition from Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/banking.
4 See JOHN K. GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA 58 (Penguin 1994); see
also JOHN K. GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHEN IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT (Houghton Mifflin 1995).
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1815, in which prices increased an annual average of 13.3%.45 As the charter of
the First Bank of the United States neared renewal, a debate began. Those in favor
of renewing the Bank's charter argued that the Bank's circulation of approximately
$5 million in paper currency accounted for almost twenty percent of the country's
money supply. 46 This was the basis of the future national currency that the U.S.
would create.
The opposition was comprised of primarily state banks. They claimed that
the Bank's issuance of bank notes came at their expense. 47 State banks also
complained that the Bank's issued currency was not discounted, unlike bank notes
issued by state banks. 48 For example, the currencies issued by 712 state banks
were discounted up to 100%.49 The result of such unfair treatment of state banks
allowed the Bank to attract more customers.50 Accordingly, Congress faced
significant pressure not to renew the Bank's charter. 51
In addition to the aforementioned currency issue, foreign ownership of the
Bank's stock, unresolved constitutional questions regarding the Bank's legitimacy,
as well as an unfounded suspicion of the banking business in general made renewal
of the Bank's charter unlikely. 52 By the year 1811, when the Bank's charter was
near expiration, Congress refused to renew it, therefore causing the Bank to cease
operations. 53
Subsequently, in 1816, Congress decided to charter the Second Bank of the
United States. 54 The Second Bank of the United States had similar powers and
responsibilities to its predecessor.55 Nevertheless, the Second Bank failed to
achieve results close to that of the First Bank of the United States.5 6 Further, the
Second Bank suffered from lack of proper management and corruption.57

45 See Edward Flaherty, A Brief History of Central Banking in the United
www.freedomdomain.com/banking/central01 .html.
46 See EDWARD L. SYMONS & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 12 (West
Publ'g 1984).
47 See Bank of the United States. The Columbia Encyclopedia,
http://www.bartleby.com/65/ba/BankUS.html
48 See OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH:
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861
49 See DAVID J. COWEN, THE ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
STATES, 1791 - 1797 (Garland Publ'g 2000).

Sixth Edition.

States,

2001-07,

A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
120-22 (1947).
FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED

5 See WILLIAM GOUGE, THE CURSE OF PAPER-MONEY AND BANKING 200 (Greenwood Press

1968) (1833).
" See LLOYD W. MINTS, A HISTORY OF BANKING THEORY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES 13-41 (1945).
52 See RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 8,

36(1978).
5 See supra note 48..
54 See Alexander Hamilton, Treasury Report on a National Bank, December 13, 1790, in I
Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States 230, 233-34 (Herman E. Krooss

ed., 1969).
5 See Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, in Legislative
and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 95, 108 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall

eds., 1967).
56 See Recommendations from Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Dallas on a National Bank,
The Second Bank of the United States (Oct. 17, 1814) (reprinted in Herman Krooss at 396-97).
" See TONY A. FREYER, PRODUCERS VERSUS CAPITALISTS: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN
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The stock ownership of the Second Bank was similar to that of the First
Bank, meaning eighty percent of shares were offered to the public and twenty
percent were offered to the federal government. 58 Shareholders of the Bank had
the right to appoint twenty directors and the President of the United States could
elect the remaining five directors. 59 Although the Bank's objective was to obtain a
"currency principle" to keep its specie (deposit) ratio consistent at approximately
twenty percent, the ratio swung between twelve and sixty-five percent. 60 Like the
First Bank of the United States, the Second Bank angered state banks by returning
to currency redemption practices. 61
The Second Bank of the United States played a significant role in limiting
issuance of state bank notes across the U.S. by providing its own federal bank
notes for specie payment. 62 In addition, states were furious particularly at the fact
that, with a charter from the federal government, the Second Bank of the United
States (for that matter, its predecessor too) could open branches and operate
wherever it wanted, without the need for state permission. 63
Great efforts were undertaken to close the Second Bank, including seeking a
determination that its existence was unconstitutional.6" In retrospect, the most
serious example occurred when the state of Maryland sought to tax activities of
branches of the Bank.65 In response, the Bank, also trying to stabilize credit and
currency, called in its loans and tightened its credit policies. 66 Litigation ensued
between the state of Maryland and the Bank, culminating in the Supreme Court
landmark decision on federal preemption, McCulloch v. Maryland67 in 1819. The
Court unanimously found the Bank's charter to be constitutional, declaring that
"[s]tates have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control" the operations of a federally created entity such as the Bank. 68
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 83 (1994).

" See Andrew Jackson, Message Vetoing the Bank Recharter, reprinted in EDWARD L. SYMONS,
JR. & JAMES J.WHITE, BANKING LAW: TEACHING MATERIALS 14-19 (1991).
5 See OFFICE OF U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL
BANKING SYSTEM (2003).

6 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, The Federal Response, and
the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, (1990)..
61 See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR (1967).
62 See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL

WAR 48-63 (1957).
63 See HERMAN E. KROSS & MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 21,
44

(1971).
6 See R. CATTRALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 186-214 (1902) (discussing
Jackson's decision not to recharter the bank).
65 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819).
66 See id. at 3 2
1.

67 See id. at 316, 436.
68 See id. What emerged was one of the landmark judicial decisions in the history of the U.S.

Speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall declared constitutional Congress's
creation of a national bank and declared unconstitutional Maryland's attempt to weaken it through
taxation. On the first opinion, Marshall elaborated the view of federal power associated with Alexander
Hamilton, an expansive view, based on a strong union. On the second point, regarding Maryland's
attack on the Second Bank, Marshall invoked the Supremacy Clause - paragraph 2 of Article VI holding that the Constitution of the United States, and the laws promulgated under it, are the law of the
land and carry a presumption of supremacy over the States. "The States," Marshall wrote, "have no
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Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "After the most deliberate consideration, it is the
unanimous and decided opinion of this court that the act to incorporate the Bank of
the United States is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution, and is part of the
supreme law of the land." 69
Appointment of Nicholas Biddle as the President of the Second Bank of the
United States in 1823 brought positive changes to the Bank. 70 However, in 1828,
as the Bank started to obtain control of money supply and restore financial
stability, Andrew Jackson, a staunch opponent of the Bank, was elected the
President of the U.S. 71 A few years prior to the expiration of the Second Bank's
charter, a debate ensued in Congress concerning renewal of the Bank's charter. 72
Eventually, Congress approved a bill to renew the charter.73 President Jackson
strongly disagreed with this bill and promptly vetoed it.74 President Jackson stated
in his veto that:
A bank of the United States is in many respects convenient for the Government and
useful to the people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the
belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank are
unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the States, and
dangerous to the liberties of the people, I felt it my duty. . .to call [to] the attention
of Congress to the practicability of organizing an institution combining all its
advantages and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret that in the act before
me I can perceive none of those modifications of the bank charter which are
necessary, in my opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound policy, or
75
with the Constitution of our country."

Facing such strong opposition from President Jackson, Congress did not pass

any other bills for renewal of the Bank's charter. 76 As result, the Bank's charter
expired in 1836.77
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B. National Banks (American Free Banking Experience) 1836 - 1860
In 1837, following the vacuum left from the Second Bank of the United
States as well as failure of several state banks, various states began considering
different ways to regulate their bank activities. The Michigan Act of 1837 was the
first "free banking" law in the United States. 78 "Free banking" meant chartering
based on the terms of a general law of incorporation rather than a particular
legislative act.79 It was a major change from the previous situation. Such a law
also authorized the issuance of banknotes. 80 Under the Michigan Act, individuals
or groups were given a banking charter conditioned upon fulfillment of the proper
prerequisites.8 1 In 1838, New York introduced a "free banking" approach. 82
Due to generally inadequate regulation of state banks, some banks failed and
some others became involved in fraud. The "free-banking" period from 1837
through 1863 was known as the "wildcat banking" era.83 This, of course, applied
only to state chartered banks; the federal government neither chartered nor
regulated. 84
Other states followed suit and adopted similar approaches in regulating the
business of banking in their states. 85
Although state banks could not issue/print money to be used as legal tender
in commerce, their notes represented bills of credit and were typically issued in
exchange for specie deposits. 86 These notes would bear the name of the issuing
bank, and would entitle the bearer to the note's face value in gold or silver, upon
presentation to the bank.87 Such notes were convenient in order to conduct large
transactions, extension of credit, etc. They could be produced easily, unlike gold
and silver stock of the nation, which were in small transactions and in decline.88 In
1837, in Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky 89, the Supreme Court ruled that state banks

1 See Gerald P. Dwyer Jr., Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, and Free Banking in the United
States, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Econ. Rev., December 1996, available at http://www.
frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/ACFCE.pdf.
'9 Nevertheless, the Act failed to fully fulfill its objectives. See LARRY J. SECHREST, FREE

BANKING: THEORY, HISTORY, AND A LAISSEZ-FAIRE MODEL 3 (1993).
'o See William H. Dillistin, Bank Note Reporters and Counterfeit Detectors, AM. NUMISMATIC
Soc'Y (1949).
' See Alpheus Felch, Early Banks and Banking Michigan, PIONEER COLLECTIONS: REPORT OF
THE PIONEER SOCIETY OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 2, 111-24 (1880).
12 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, NATIONAL
BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM (2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/

DualBanking.pdf
' See John J. Schroeder, Duel Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of
Regulatory Practice, ConstitutionalIssues, and PhilosophicalQuestions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197 (2003).
84 See HUGH ROCKOFF, THE FREE BANKING ERA: A REEXAMINATION, (1975).
85 See Kenneth Ng, Free Banking Laws and Barriers to Entry in Banking, 1838-1860, 48 J. ECON.
HIST., 877-89 (1988).
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were constitutional and also the notes issued from them were constitutional. 90
During the "free banking" era, there were 712 state banks in operation, each
having their own currency. 91 By today's standards, it is difficult to imagine how
individuals and businesses conducted their business affairs, while trying to
measure the risk and value of several different banknotes. By taking advantage of
the limited supply of gold and other precious coins being used as "money" in
commerce, state banks supplied a vast amount of what was used as circulating
currency. 92
State banks were generally required to buy state bonds, at market value, and
then deposit the bonds with the state auditor as collateral. 93 State banks could also
issue banknotes in value not higher than the value of the bonds. 94 Therefore,
performance of the bond market had a direct effect on the ability of the banks to
issue banknotes. 95 In addition, state banks were required to redeem banknotes in
gold or other precious coins. 96 State banks' examiners were responsible for
regulating and enforcing state banks' reserve requirement.97 Depositors were
98
granted a lien on state banks' assets.
A survey of "free banking" activities of 709 state banks in the states of New
York, Indiana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin from 1838 to 1863, revealed that
approximately half of these banks failed to redeem their own banknotes for specie,
approximately sixteen percent of these banks could not redeem their own
banknotes, and approximately sixteen percent of banks survived for less than one
year (in fact, the average existence of state banks was almost five years). 99 The
losses suffered by depositors in each of the four states were between $1.6 million
and $2.1 million.100
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The issue in the case was by issuing notes and currency, did the bank violate the constitutional
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Briscoe's argument. The clause prohibiting bills of credit applied to notes issued indirectly through a
corporation. But the bank had issued the notes on its own credit, not on the credit of the state.
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A significant cause of state bank failure was a decline in the market value of
the bonds banks held. 0 1 As previously stated, banks were typically required to
link note issues to the value of the bank's bond holdings.102 Upon occurrence of a
decline in the market value of the bank's bonds, the bank was required by state
authority to withdraw part of its currency from circulation. 103 This meant that the
bank would call in loans, which resulted in shortage of monies supply, as well as a
stricter regime of credit to individuals and businesses. 104
By the year 1860, more than half of the states in the U.S. had passed "free
banking" laws.105 The trend continued in the coming years. 106 The shape of the
banking landscape changed markedly in 1863, with the passage of the first of the
National Banking Acts, whereby the federal government became re-involved in the
U.S. financial system.
C. Survival of State Banks After 1863
The main purpose of Congress in enacting the National Bank Acts of 1863
and 1864, was to form a system of nationally chartered banks, establish a uniform
national currency and create an active secondary market for Treasury securities to
assist in financing the Civil War.107 Provisions of the Acts included free entry and
collateralized bank notes. 08 The Acts were aimed at facilitating federal control
over the U.S. banking system without the formation of a central bank. 109
As previously mentioned, states began the widespread chartering of banks
well before the federal government. Congress together with Salmon P. Chase,
Secretary of the Treasury, expected state banks to apply for federal charters, go out
of business and form a system of nationally chartered banks. 110 Presumably, this
would result in a uniform national currency and create an active secondary market
Such
for Treasury securities that were all supportive of financing the Civil War.'

OF MINNEAPOLIS, STAFF REPORT 80 (1982).

'o' See Kurt Schuler, Note Issue by Banks: A Step Toward Banking in the United States?, CATO
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102 See infra note 93.
103 See infra note 94.
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17, (1993).
05 See Howard Bodenhorn, Bank Charteringand PoliticalCorruption in Antebellum New York:
Free Banking Reform (Natl. Bureau of Econ, Research, Working Paper No. W10479, 2004).
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'o' See Mark Furletti, The Debate Over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts
to Regulate CreditCards, 77 TEMPLE L.REV. 425, 449 (2004).
'os See Comment, Circumventing the McFadden Act: The Comptroller of the Currency s Efforts to
Broadenthe Branching CapabilitiesofNational Banks, 72 Ky. L.J. 707 (1984).
109 See National Banking Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NationalBanking Act.
1'0 See Wayne A. Abernathy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Institutions. A
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expectation was never achieved. 112 The dual banking system we know today was
essentially a historical accident and not the intention of Congress. 113
When Congress saw that the 1863 and 1864 Acts failed to convince state
banks to convert to federal charters, it tried a different approach. This time, in
1865, Congress passed acts, which would impose a prohibitive ten percent tax on
state banknotes. 114 There was no such corresponding tax on national banknotes. 115
It was unclear whether Congress' intent was to assure only one kind of currency or
to push individual states out of the bank business. Many state banks could not
withstand the tax burden and closed.' 1 6 In 1864, the number of state banks was
1,500. By the end of the decade, the number was reduced to 250.117 Surviving
state banks, however, were able to avoid the tax by creating checking accounts
(demand deposits), which eliminated the need for banknotes.1 18
By 1870, there were 1,638 national banks and only 325 state banks.119 In the
1870's, banks started to replace usage of paper and coin currency with deposits. 120
Depending upon the state(s) involved, state charted banks often had numerous
advantages over the federally chartered banks. State banks were usually permitted
to keep lower cash reserves relative to deposits and less capital.1 21 They also had
more flexible opportunities in branching out than federally chartered banks,
including the potential to branch interstate if state law permitted, an ability not
granted to national banks until the Reigle-Neal Act of 1994.122 In addition, state
banks tended to have fewer restrictions than federally chartered banks on the kinds
of loans they could make.123
Although state banks were banknote taxed, they held more customer deposits
than national banks. 124 Such dory advantages fostered a resurgence in the number
of state banks.125 For instance, in the year 1888, there were about 3,500 state

1I2See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Banking Law Symposium: Recent Challenges to the Persistent
Dual Banking System, 41 ST. Louis L.J. 263 (1996).
" See National Bank Act, Ch. 106, 13 STAT. 99 (1864).
114 See GEORGE A. SELGIN & LAWRENCE H. WHITE, MONETARY REFORM AND THE REDEMPTION
OF NATIONAL BANK NOTES, 1863-1913 (1994).
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banks and 3,100 national banks. 126 Some newly established banks saw the
prohibitive tax on states' banknotes as an incentive to request national charters.
Gradually, state banks seeking federal charters began to increase. 127 The structure
of a dual banking system began to take form. 128 During the period 1873 through
1907, demand deposits outweighed coin and paper currency circulation. 129 Banks
unable to meet immediate payment of their demand deposits often collapsed.130
Their depositors suffered loss of a portion or in some instances, all of their funds
on deposit. 131 The average yearly failing rate for banks from 1870 through 1913
was 0.78% (as compared to 1.01% for non-banks). 132The state bank instabilities
contributed to the bank crises of 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907.
Congress created the Federal Reserve Act 13 3 of 1913.134 The Federal
Reserve System ("Fed") was the central bank of the United States. The main
objectives of the Federal Reserve were to facilitate the flow of bank reserves from
capital surplus to capital deficient areas, to provide liquidity by means of a
discount facility (called and in fact structured as a window) to banks suffering
temporary liquidity problems, and to provide liquidity to the banking system by
offsetting outflows of currency and gold. 135 The Fed, however, failed to attain
these objectives and prevent the financial (banking) crisis of the 1930's, the 1970's
and 1980's.136 Ironically, the banking industry had smoother sailing before
formation of the Fed. In fact, the Fed introduced greater "rigidities" during the
Great Depression (such as prohibition of the clearing house certificates issuance,
making temporary bank suspensions more difficult, etc.) than were in existence
prior to creation of the Fed. 137
Through the Twentieth Century, a constant series of occurrenceslegislative, economic, even philosophic in nature-tested the vigor of the state
bank system. 138 Although often weak, small, poorly regulated and inadequately
funded, the state bank system, even when brought to its knees as part of a faltering
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economy, responded both timely and shrewdly to these events which often did not
take into consideration the well-being of state bank activities. 139 State banks have
not only survived but have successfully competed with their federal rivals. 140
Much of the Twentieth Century reflected a significant growth in the number of
banks. 141 State and federal, they reached about 30,000, an all time high, in the
early 1920s.142
Problems with adverse effects upon the state banking system include:
i) Bank collapses escalated rapidly in a fourteen year period, from 1920 to
1933, to almost 9,000 commercial banks, which suspended operations, the majority
of which failed. 143 In particular, small-sized banks were hit the hardest. These
small banks were primarily located in small rural areas in the Midwest and were
unable to weather the post World War I recession; 14 but their failures did not have
any substantial impact on the national financial system. 145
ii) Banks took a heavy blow during the Great Depression.146 From 1929
(stock market crash) until 1933, commercial banks were reduced roughly from
26,000 to 14,000.147 Deposits dropped by approximately thirty-five percent. 148
Depositors rushed to withdraw their monies from the banks, 149 and people sought
to protect themselves by hoarding gold.150 The result was a national contraction of
credit. 15t
iii) In 1932, under the leadership of Senator Carter Glass, a Democrat from
Virginia, and Representative Henry B. Steagall, a Democrat from Alabama, efforts
were made to expand banks' credit. 152 This resulted in the Fed issuing rules to

'3 See Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1,
12 (1993).
140 See Christian A. Johnson, Wild CardStatutes, Parity,and National Banks - The Renascence of
State Banking Powers, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 351 (1995).
141 See Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994,
33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 183 (1996).
142 See ELMUS WICKER, THE BANKING PANICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION, (Cambridge Univ.

Press, 1996).
143 See Kris James Mitchener, Are PrudentialSupervision and Regulation Pillars of Financial
Stability? Evidencefrom the Great Depression,50 J. L. & ECON. 273.
144 See George G. Kaufman, The US Banking Debacle of the 1980s: A Lesson in Government
Mismanagement Vol. 45 No. 4 THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY (1995).
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146See Art Alcausin Hall, InternationalBanking Regulation into the 21' Century: Flirting With
Revolution, 21 N. Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41 (2001).
47 See supra, note 145.
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liberalize acceptance of commercial paper for re-discount purposes. 53 In addition,
more than $750 million of the nation's gold reserve was made available for loans
to individuals and businesses.154 The initiative taken from Glass and Steagall
seemed to have positive results as evidenced by the number of bank failures that
dramatically decreased. 155
Nevertheless, from the end of 1932 to the beginning of 1933, another wave
of bank failures hit the U.S.15 6 This time such failures led to a significant banking
crisis, which required the intervention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.157 His
first act as President was to declare a "bank holiday" in the country by closing all
banks for at least one week (actually banks were closed for four days).1ss Such
action was intended to stop panicky withdrawals by depositors.1 59 President
Roosevelt's decision was effective.1 60 The U.S. government warned those banks,
which were not insolvent to not open their businesses.161
iv) Under these difficult circumstances, Congress passed the Banking Act of
1933162 (commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act), which in part prohibited
commercial banks from getting into the investment banking business.163 The Act
also prohibited the payment of interest on demand deposits and established the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") as a temporary agency.164
v) Two years later, Congress passed the Banking Act of 1935165, which
established the FDIC as a permanent government agency.166 The FDIC's main

'1 See Thomas M. Humphrey, The Choice of a Monetary Policy Framework: Lessons from the
1920s. CATO JOURNAL, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2001).
154 See Cliffs Notes, The Beginnings of the Great Depression, at http://www.cliffsnotes.com/
WileyCDA/CliffsReviewTopic/topicArticleld-25238,articleld-25205.html (last visited July 16, 2008).
5 See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS A HISTORY OF THE FDIC
1933-1983 (FDIC ed., 1984), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/Chron/prefdic/index.html.
56 See Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Closed for the Holiday, The Bank Holiday of 1933
http://www.bos.frb.org/about/pubs/closed.pdf.
i5 See Lawrence M. Stratton & Paul C. Roberts, The Fed's "Depression" and the Birth of the New
Deal, HOOVER INST.,
2001 available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/
3476271.html.
" See James L. Butkiewicz, The Reconstruction Finance Corporatiom, the Gold Standard,and
the Banking Panicof 1933, 66 S. ECON. J. (1999).
'
See Eugene Nelson White, The Political Economy of Banking Regulation, 1864-1933, 42 J. of
Econ. Hist., 33, 33-40 (1982).
5 See William L. Silber, Why Did FDR's Bank Holiday Succeed? SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK (SSRN), Aug. 2007, at http://ssm.com/abstract=1013606.
1so See William L. Silber,
Why Did FDRs Bank Holiday Succeed? SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (SSRN), Aug. 2007, at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1013606.
161 id.
162 See Banking Act of 1933 Pub. L. No. 73-66,
48 Stat. 162.
163 See Joseph M. Heppt, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A Proposalfor the Reform
of GlassSteagall, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 281 (1986).
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167
purpose was to require banks to maintain sufficient assets to remain solvent.
Opponents of the Act argued it would encourage bad banking, creating a burden to
the taxpayer.168
vi) By the end of 1934, the banking system started to recover from the Great
Depression, and by 1937, bank deposits had reached pre-Depression levels. 169
During World War 11 (1939 through 1945), bank deposits increased substantially
and in fact doubled between 1941 and 1946.170
171
vii) In 1956, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act , one
172
As a result, banks tended to
effect of which was to inhibit interstate banking.
remain small and focused primarily on business within local markets. 173 The Act
also limited activities of bank holding companies to those activities "closely
related" to banking.174 Thereafter, the banking system remained relatively stable,
with bank failures occurring at a rate of approximately ten per year.175
viii) History repeated itself during the financial crisis of the 1980s.1 76
Although the actual number of banks that failed in the 1930s well exceeded the
number of failures in the 1980s, the actual asset decreases were dramatically
higher in the 1980s.'7 During the 1980s, a dozen Savings and Loans Associations
lent monies to people in the commercial real estate markets, which collapsed.' 7 8
Since debtors were unable to pay these associations back, the latter went out of
businesS.1 79 From 1980 to 1992, the number of the Savings and Loan Associations
decreased from 3,998 to 2,039. In response to this situation Congress, in 1989,
consolidated the deposit insurance of banks under the FDIC180. In addition, two
funds were formed, the Bank Insurance Fund (the "BIF")1 81, which covers

161 See Elizabeth H. Garrett, The Modified Payoff of Failed Banks: A Settlement Practice To Inject
Market Discipline Into the Commercial Banking System, 73 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1987).
68 See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., "Our Banking History", Speech at the
Annual Meeting and Conference of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, (May 2, 1998), available
at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980502.htm.
69 See Christina D. Romer, The Nation in Depression, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.
7, No. 2 (Spring, 1993).
7o See Richard T. Selden, The Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money a Sectoral Analysis, 16 J.
Fin., 4 (Dec., 1961).
1' See Bank Holding Act of 1956 Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133.
171 See Lissa L. Broome, Symposium: Financial Institutions, The S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration: Private Market Solutions to the Savings and Loan Crisis: Bank Holding Company
Acquisitions ofSavings Associations, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. Il I(1990).
1 See The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,9 STAN. L. REv. 2 (Mar., 1957).
174 Id.
175 See Kaufman, supra note 144.
17 See FDIC, An Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980s and Early 1990s, Vol. 1,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol I.htmi.
17 Id.

"" See id.

"7 See Savings and Loan Crisis, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings andLoan crisis .
'8o See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 at Pub. L. No. 10173, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
' Insured banks pay a premium on all their deposits, even those deposits that are not covered by
insurance. For many years, premium income exceeded the cost of failures. But as the size of bank
failures increased, the BIF went into the red in 1991. Instead of being declared insolvent, however, its
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commercial banks and savings banks, and the Savings Association Insurance Fund
(the "SAIF"), which insures deposits at S&Ls. 182
ix) In 1980, Congress enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act, 183 which eliminated federal ceilings on deposit interest
rates.
x) On September 29, 1994, Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, 184 Under this Act, Congress permitted
banks to branch beyond state lines.185
xi) In 1999, Congress abolished major portions of the Glass-Steagall Act
and removed some of the restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act, by
enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 186 This Act allowed bank holding
companies to engage in a full range of financial services, including lending, taking
deposits, investment advising, insuring, stock and bond underwriting, and other
investment banking services.187
In retrospect, state banks have responded both timely and shrewdly to all
changes in legislation and other federal regulatory initiatives, which often did not
take into consideration the health of state banking activities. State banks have
discovered how to not only survive, but to compete successfully with federally
chartered banks.
Ill. PURPORTED BENEFITS OF THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM

A. Cruciblesfor Innovation / Brandeis
In 1932, Justice Louis Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann18 8 stated the important role which state law plays in the American
federalist system of government. 189 He said:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel

losses were covered with loans from the US Treasury, as authorized by Congress. In 1992, the fund
staged a comeback. With increased premiums and a sharp improvement in bank profitability due to a
drop in the interest rates, the BIF repaid its loans and was well in the black again by mid-1993.
182 See supra note 53.
183 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mandatory Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
184 See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branding
Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
1 See David S. Dahl, Kathy Cobb & David Fettig, Interstate Branch Banking: Opt In or Opt
Out?, fedgazette, (1995) http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/95-0 I/fg95 Ib.cfm.
6 See GrammPub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
18 See Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, Business Divisionsfrom the Perspectiveofthe U.S. Banking
System, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. (2003).

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
189See Adam Cohen, Brandeis 's Views on States' Rights, and Ice-Making, Have New Relevance,
N.Y. Times, December 7, 2003.
88
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19 0
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.

Justice Brandeis' dissent was based on public concern over the possibility of
"destructive competition" in the ice business as well as the industry's
responsibility to consumers and need of Oklahoma's economy for the licensing
scheme. 191 However, the gravamen of Justice Brandeis' dissent concerned his
statement on the states' roles as laboratories of innovation. 192
The laboratories of innovation concept shows up in various examples where
states originated positive change in the banking system. 193 For instance, the
"negotiable order of withdrawal" ( "NOW") accounts-which, technical
definitions aside, enabled the payment of interest on consumer demand depositswere created by state banks. 194 In the 1980's, states also provided their banks
more power than the federal banking institutions in securities and insurance
activities. 195 In addition, state banks tended to engage in more real estate
brokerage and development activities than did national banks. The entry by state
chartered bank subsidiaries into insurance, securities, as well as real estate
activities stimulated the Fed to broaden non-banking activities of bank affiliates in
a holding company. 196
Justice Brandeis' concept of states as "laboratories of innovation" was one of
the most well known federalist metaphors. In the context of banking, it was
considered to provide states with the power to "experiment" with people's
monies. 197 However, the famous dictum did not seem to have anything to do with
federalism; rather it articulated a commitment to scientific/socialist methods of
experimentation at the state level. 198
Both liberal and conservative justices have quoted Justice Brandeis in
various cases, conveying pragmatic spirit, which logically appeals to compulsive
tinkerers, connoting equally popular sentiments in favor of localism and
decentralization. 199
Under the laboratory metaphor a strong case can be made for the power held

190The ice company was licensed by the State of Oklahoma, whose legislature had determined that
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice were a public business and that a license was required by
anyone seeking to enter the business. An ice company contended that the act providing for the license
was valid. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that a regulation which had the effect of denying or
unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business, such as that under
review, could not be upheld consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.
'9' See Adam Cohen, Looking Back on Louis Brandeis on His 150' Birthday, N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 2006.
192 See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal Criminal
Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18 (2003).
i9 See Robert C. Eager, Remarks at the North Carolina Banking Institute (April 1, 2004).
"94 Consumer Say. Bank v. Massachusetts 361 Mass. 717 (1972).
'9 This encouraged the OCC to develop national banks subsidiary operations.
96 Eager, supra note 77.
i9 See. Charles Fried, Federalism - Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. I.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2-3
(1982).
9 Cohen, supra note 190.
'9 See Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy: Anatomy of a Metaphor (2001)
www.aei.org/publications/publD. 12743/pubdetail.asp.
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by state institutions capable of adapting to changes of economic circumstances and
social values. A state based experiment reduces the risk naturally associated with
national action. Successful state experiments with banking regulation have taught
valuable lessons and have built public confidence in innovative policies. In the
end, such experiments have created a receptive environment for banking models
and policy recommendations, which may have gone unappreciated at the federal
In addition, state banking-based innovation accommodates
banking level.
adaptation to local needs, circumstances, and preferences of the state banking
community. 200
Legislative banking experiments must be limited by the authority granted by
state law. Banking policy experiments do not function with the efficiency of
disinterested, scientific process of trial and error. Experiment bears risks generated
mainly from the fact that state bank regulatory experiment carries a heavy burden
of responsibility to the state citizens. The goal is to limit what state bank
regulators may do to state chartered banks and state consumers, inhibit rash,
indiscriminating lawmaking, and protect the welfare of the state banking system. 201
Constitutional constraint and state bank policy experiment breed unavoidable
friction with each other. However, out of this friction can come innovated banking
activities, which facilitate consumer and business banking activities at the cheapest
cost. 202 Justice Brandeis' "laboratories of innovation" can transform state
governments into a vanguard for the national administrative state. 203
Experimentation, at the state level, in social and economic innovations is a
serious responsibility. Denial of a state's experiment rights has had, as a
consequence of FIDICIA, consequences to the country. Indeed, the federal system
could benefit from a single courageous state's choice to act as a laboratory,
attempting social and economic experiments, without risk being imposed
nationwide. 204 Further, federal courts have the power to prevent states from
exercising such right of experimentation, if they judge the state's acts to be unfit,
arbitrary or against public interest. 205
Justice Brandeis said that the cheap cost to get in the business of the ice
market would lead to "wasteful", "destructive", and "ruinous" competition. 206 As
a result, consumers would "suffer" because producers "go to extremes in cutting
prices." 207 Some producers will be pushed out of business as a result of being
unable to collect their costs. Therefore, "the business of ice . . . lends itself

2

See New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

201See Greve, supra note 199.
202 id.
203 See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 847, 853-55 (1979).
2 See STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF
Louis DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 171 (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994),..
20s See New State Ice, supra note 200, at 311.
206See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 151-53 (Yale
University Press, 2000).
207 See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 292.
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peculiarly to monopoly" pricing. 208 Monopoly risk had nothing to do with the
licensing scheme. The Oklahoma state statute was meant to "create and foster"
rather than to abate "monopoly in the hands of existing establishments, against,
rather than in aid of, the interest of the consuming public." 209
Justice Brandeis saw federalist "experimentation in things social and
economic" 210 as a way to progressive ends. Due, in part, to Justice Brandeis state
laboratory doctrine, courts have empowered state governments through creative
interpretations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. 211 In addition, courts have
resurrected constitutional doctrines, which in turn, have disciplined state
governments to encourage state governments to compete with the federal
government to improve their own citizens' lives. 212
More recently, Justice Stevens, based on Justice Brandeis' dissent in New
State Ice, argued that the Supreme Court ought to set aside constitutional concerns
over an experiment in line with prevailing state efforts to overcome the "atavistic"
sentiments that hold up private discrimination against social issues, such as
homosexuality concerns. 213
Justice Brandeis might well have welcomed the solutions to many of the
nation's economic and social concerns, which have emerged from his "states as
laboratories of experimentation of democracy" premise; and correspondingly
would more than likely be unsatisfied with the trend of later legislation. The
legislation has diminished the role of state experimentation regardless of the
Supreme Court's right to protect the power authority of States in the name of
constitutional federalism. 214 The Supreme Court's approach towards states'
innovative experimentation remains an important issue, which deserves both public
and expert attention. 215
Justice Brandeis' articulation on the states' right to serve as laboratories for
20' Id. at 291.
209 Funny that

this should be true of many other decisions that form the foundation of the post-New
Deal Court's jurisprudence - for instance, the famous 1938 decision in the United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which established the Supreme Court's "dual standard" of judicial
review (none for economic rights, plenty for a few other rights and especially those of "discrete and
insular minorities"). See MICHAEL C. DORF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 397 (Foundation Press
2004)
210 See, e.g., PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 89 (Lawrence University
Press of Kansas 1993).
21 See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001).
212 See, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (J. Kennedy, concurring); and United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
213 Cruzan v. Dir. Dept. of Pub. Health, 497 U.S. 261, 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting); but see id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing the New State Ice dissent, 497 U.S. 261, 292); Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2459 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); and Vacco v. Quill and
Glucksman v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Dale, Chief Justice
Rehnquist responded to Justice Stevens' venomous dissent that "Justice Brandeis was never a champion
of state experimentation in the suppression of free speech." Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2457. While that is
technically true, the Stevens dissent is true to the spirit of Brandeis' jurisprudence.
214See G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific
Management, PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM, Jan. 2001, at 40.
215 See Douglas T. Kendall, Ouch! You 're Hurting Us: How the Court Is Stifling Innovation at the

State Level, WASH. POST., Nov. 14, 2004, at B03..
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experimentation, as well as a dozen court rulings, which based their arguments on
Justice Brandeis' findings, have had an impact on state bank authorities in
regulating their banking systems. Today, however, state regulators are inhibited in
"experimenting" with state banking activities by the principles of FIDICIA, which
fundamentally limit state bank powers to those of national banks. 216 FIDICIA,
when considered together with the wild card statutes have forced state banks and
national banks to mirror each other and have consequently deprived the country of
the benefits of its dual banking concept.
B. Competition Among Regulators and Opportunitiesfor Banks
The structure of the U.S. bank regulatory system is unique in the world. In
America, banks report to a combination of federal and state banking regulators.
Banks can select their own type of charter, federal or state, which best fits their
business purpose. Commercial banks, which are federally chartered, are regulated
by the OCC. On the other hand, state banks are regulated by their home states and
occasionally a federal regulator (e.g., the Federal Reserve System regulates state
chartered banks which voluntarily select membership in the Federal Reserve; the
FDIC regulates state, nonmember banks). In other words, banks determine which
regulators they will report to based on the chosen charter.
Traditionally, federal and state bank regulators compete for banks to adopt
their respective charters. In the end, productivity of the regulators is demonstrated
less by volume of their regulations than by the number and size of banks within
their regulatory spheres. As a result of this competition, individual banks are the
winners.
American banking history has proven that when one regulator fails to
provide banks with the right conditions, banks will find other opportunities
elsewhere, mainly by switching to another charter. Classic examples are Marine
Midland Bank (presently HSBC Bank USA) and later J.P. Morgan Chase Bank.
1. Marine Midland Experience
In the 1970's, Marine Midland Bank found itself in financial difficulty. The
bank had expanded across New York State, particularly in New York City, without
a clear strategy and long term expansion plan. 217
Finding itself in deep water, Marine Midland Bank sought financing. The
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corp. ("HSBC"), a wealthy bank located in Hong
Kong, seemed to be the perfect suitor for Marine Midland Bank. HSBC expressed
interest in acquiring a portion of Marine Midland. Before entering into this
transaction, Marine Midland Bank sought to obtain permission from the New York
State Banking Department, the bank's chartering regulatory authority. 218 The New

216

See

211

See CARL FELSENFELD,

Michael P. Malloy, FOREWORD:
...AND BACKWARD:
DEATH AND
TRANSFIGURATIONAMONG THE SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. SI (1991)..
21

BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2d ed. 2006).
There seemed to be no requirement that its regulatory approval be obtained; but responsible

banks generally will share their plans, particularly those as important as switching a charter, with their
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York State Banking Department flatly rejected Marine Midland Bank' permission.
In order to justify its position, the New York State Banking Department made
unnecessary disclosure demands on Marine Midland. 219
In an effort to foster the HSBC/Marine Midland transaction, Governor Hugh
Carey sought legislation aimed at overcoming the objections of the New York
State Banking Department and its Superintendent, Muriel Siebert. The Chairman
of Marine Midland, Mr. Edward W. Duffy, tried his best to diminish
Superintendent Siebert's fear of possible "Chinese" (HSBC) control of Marine
Midland. Governor Carey also discounted Chinese control over Marine Midland.
Some conservative members of the New York State Assembly, such as Assembly
Banking Committee Chairman, Herman D. Farrell, proposed legislation which
would have prohibited foreign banks from acquiring New York State banks with
assets over two billion dollars, and would have required public hearings on foreign
takeovers of smaller banks. 220 Such legislation could have prohibited the Marine
Midland Bank takeover. Superintendent Siebert expressed fear that HSBC would
have shifted Marine Midland's focus from domestic lending to international trade,
221
adding that HSBC had not provided adequate financial information.
As the word circulated internally at Marine Midland Bank that HSBC was
acquiring shares of the bank, the bad jokes began. Word spread among Marine
Midland's almost 11,000 employees that HSBC was taking the "silver out of the
dining room and replacing it with chopsticks". 222 The headline of a local
newspaper in upstate New York read "Red Chinese Buy Midland". 223
Facing the difficulties presented by the New York State Banking
Department, Marine Midland Bank made a strategic decision; it converted from a
New York State-charter to a federal charter. 224 The decision eradicated the need
for the unreasonable disclosure sought by the state and expedited the transaction.
The OCC's approval order on Marine Midland application stated that "areas of
MMB's [Marine Midland Bank] performance are judged to be capable of
significant improvements". 225
New York Banking Superintendent Siebert sat on the proposed HSBC state
level acquisition of Marine Midland for months. After the department refused
Marine Midland's request, Comptroller of the Currency John Heimann wasted no
time "inviting" the bank under OCC's umbrella. (Formally, it was Marine
Midland bank's application for a national charter since the Federal Reserve had
already approved the application for control of the bank.) 226
primary regulators.
219 See Hongkong and ShanghaiBank Bids $70 a Share, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 15, 1987.
220 See Richard J. Meislin, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
1979, at Dl.
221

Id.

222 See

Robert Cottrell & Paul Taylor, Autonomy for 'Mighty Mouse', FINANCIAL TIMES, May
2,

1984, at A10.
223
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224 See RICHARD C. BROWN & BOB WATSON, BUFFALO: LAKE CITY IN NIAGARA LAND
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(Windsor Publications 1981).
225 See Washington Bureau, "Marine Mid. Wins National
Charter," AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 29,
1980, at 1.
226 See The Comptroller's Foreign Banks Study, ABA BANKING JOURNAL,
May 1980, at 34.
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Taking advantage of the Marine Midland case, the OCC then undertook a
comprehensive study of foreign banks operating in the U.S. Conclusions of the
study were so thorough that it could have easily held up action in the Marine
Midland case for longer time than the OCC intended to devote to the application.
Running against time, Comptroller Heimann went ahead and granted a national
charter to Marine Midland. 227
Marine Midland's shareholders approved the accord. 228 As a result, Marine
Midland would receive $230 million in new capital from the sale of new stock to
HSBC. 229 With the blessing of the OCC, HSBC acquired 51 percent ownership of
Marine Midland in 1980230 for $314 million. 231 Upon acquisition, Marine
Midland's assets were close to $20 billion. 232
For Marine Midland, the HSBC investment came at a crucial time due to the
bank's inability to tap capital markets to support its growing asset base. The bank
had sharply reduced earnings in the years prior to the HSBC's acquisition. 233 In
1975, Marine Midland branches were under surveillance by state bank regulators
because financial troubles were affecting earnings and reducing dividends to the
bank's shareholders. 234
Marine Midland proved to the New York State Banking Department that
banks will do whatever it takes, even switching charters, in order to achieve their
business goals. The New York State Banking Department learned a valuable
lesson the hard way: the state bank regulator's failure to provide suitable
conditions for state chartered banks to conduct banking business could translate
into loss of business for state regulators. One can easily imagine a switch from
federal to state regulation if the underlying facts were different. This type of
behavior might be seen as the dual banking system in action.
2. Recent JP Morgan Chase & Co. Switch
In early 2004, the New York State Banking Department and federal
regulators closely watched how JP Morgan Chase & Co. would sort through the
web of federal and state banking charters the bank would have once it closed the
deal to acquire Bank One Corp. The New York State Banking Department at the
time oversaw over 100 banks and thrifts that together held approximately one

227 id.

See Eric N. Berg, Hong Kong Bank Seeks Marine's Remaining, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 1987.
See N.Y. Times, Section 4, Pg. 4, Column 6, October 18, 1979.
230 See Nancy Buckwalter, Building the 'New Marine'; Cash Infusion, A New Strategic Focus
Aimed at Building a Multistate, Multinational Competitor, NATIONAL EDITION, August 1983, at 48.
HSBC extended full ownership of Marine Midland Bank in 1987 in which HSBC spent $770 million.
Marine Midland Bank branch offices were branded as "HSBC Bank USA". Id.
231 See Richard C. Morais, Bullterrier Banking, FORBES, July 24, 2000.
232 See RICHARD C. BROWN & BOB WATSON, BUFFALO: LAKE CITY IN NIAGARA LAND 297
228
229

(Windsor Publications 1981).
233Id.

234 See Jack Egan, Hong Kong Shanghai Corp. to Buy 51% of Marine Midland, , WASH. POST,
April 6, 1978, at DIO.
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trillion dollars in assets. 235 The department was the largest state banking
supervisor in the U.S. 236
About 60 percent (equivalent to approximately $638 billion) of bank and
237
thrift assets supervised by the Department, resided in JP Morgan Chase Bank.
As such, JP Morgan Chase was a "rain-maker" for the budget of the State Banking
Department. The bank paid $17.2 million in assessment fees to the department in
238
fiscal 2002, or 24.5 percent of the department's $70 million budget.
Eager to keep JP Morgan Chase under New York State supervision, the
Department's Superintendent, Diane Taylor, admitted that "[y]ou have to be
prepared for everything. Nothing is a given in this world. We'd have some
reconfiguring to do. Obviously their assessment is a substantial portion of our
revenue". 239
Superintendent Taylor nervously tried to remain calm in the face of
speculations that the New York State Banking Department would fight "tooth and
nail" with federal regulators to keep JP Morgan Chase under New York charter
after acquiring Bank One Corp. In this regard she said:
"We're not a marketing organization ...JP Morgan Chase should choose the
banking charter that best suits the company's needs. I want them to make the best
decision for the bank as a whole, because it is a very important for the economy of
the state of New York. I am hoping that the New York State charter is a part of
that. I think it's a very good charter. It allows a lot of innovation; there are a lot of
good things about the charter, and I hope it is within their business plan to continue
24 0
to work with us".

Traditionally, state and federal bank regulators constantly lobby banks to
retain or switch charters. For example, in 2000, the Comptroller of the Currency,
John D. Hawke Jr., went personally to Memphis and tried to "convince" National
241
Bank of Commerce from switching to a Tennessee charter.
The New York State Banking Department, among others, hoped that a sense
of the bank's history with the State of New York (since 1799 the bank's original
predecessor company, The Manhattan Co. was established in New York) JP
242
Morgan Chase & Co. would decide to remain "loyal" to its New York roots.
Ultimately, JP Morgan Chase & Co. declared that the bank would switch its
state charter to a federally chartered bank in order to avoid conflicting New York

2
See Press Release, State of New York Banking Department, Consumer and Banking Officials
Team Up to Launch 'Bank on New York' Campaign - Dozen of Financial Institutions to Participate in
Effort to Encourage Low-Income New Yorkers to Open Bank and Credit Union Accounts (Jan. 6,
2005).
236 See Diane Taylor, Letter to the Editor, N. Y. Banking Department a Power Despite Chase and
HSBC, AMERICAN BANKER, July 10, 2004, availableat www.banking.state.ny.us/pr040720a.htm.
237 See Craig Linder, JPM- Bank One: How It Might Hit Regulators, AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 27,
2004, at 1.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 id.

2008

Is THERE A DUAL BANKING SYSTEM?

57

State requirements on lending practices. 243
During the summer of 2004, the OCC granted JP Morgan Chase conditional
approval for the holding company's lead bank subsidiary to adopt a national
charter. About one week after the purchase of Bank One Corp., JP Morgan Chase
Bank applied to convert from a state charter to a federal charter. On October 13,
2004, the OCC released a letter, which gave the bank its formal approval. 244 On
July 9, 2004, a JP Morgan Chase spokeswoman said: "The national charter will
allow the new bank, like Bank One and like all of our major competitors, to follow
uniform national regulation rather than separate rules for each state in which we
245
operate."
Today, JP Morgan Chase & Co. maintains corporate headquarters in New
York City, and the bank's retail financial services and commercial banking
headquarters are in Chicago. 246 According to the Bank, its assets in 2005 were
$1.1 trillion, and it maintained operations in more than fifty countries. 247
Under federal charter, Chase Bank would operate about 300 branches of
Chase Mortgage, which is one of the top ten non-prime lenders in the country.
Chase Bank chooses to keep the former JP Morgan's mortgage operations under
federal charter in forty-seven states. There was no change made for Chase Bank in
the states of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut because the bank was
already conducting commercial banking activities in these states, therefore
exempting the bank from restrictive state banking laws. 248
In retrospect, the main reason JP Morgan Chase & Co. selected the federal
charter was probably the aggressive legal actions taken by New York State in the
areas of lending and privacy. 249 The Bank anticipated that the Federal charter
would exempt it from conflicting and deleterious state laws. As put by JP Morgan
Chase spokeswoman, Charlotte Gilbert-Biro: "A number of existing operations
outside our [JP Morgan Chase & Co.] tri-state bank markets will become part of
the FSB [Federal Savings Bank] so that we will be organized and operate in those
markets as our customers see us, as a single financial services provider". 250
Additionally, executives of J.P. Morgan Chase admitted that having a
national charter was intended to make it easier for the bank to offer products and
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PHOENIX BUSINESS
JOURNAL, May 5, 2006.
247 See JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase:
History, http://www.jpmorganchase.com/cm/
cs?pagename=Chase/Href&urlname=jpmc/about/history (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
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services across its seventeen state territories. 251
JP Morgan Chase was the second high profile bank in 2004 to switch from a
New York State charter to a national charter. HSBC Bank USA, the primary
domestic bank subsidiary of HSBC Holdings PLC, with $99.9 billion of assets,
completed its charter swap on July 1, 2004. HSBC's choice of a federal charter
also struck a major budget blow to the New York State Banking Department. 252
According to the estimates of the Department, assessment fees that the agency
charged those two banks totaled 27.8 percent of its $77.5 million budget for fiscal
year 2003.253
In the same year, 2004, "inspired" by JP Morgan Chase's move, Harris Trust
and Savings Bank of Chicago with $54 billion in assets, applied to the OCC to
consolidate its twenty-five Illinois bank charters into a national charter, the new
bank to be called "Harris Bank". 254
The JP Morgan Chase charter swap was a watershed moment in U.S.
banking history, and may impact the future of dual banking. The issue for
regulators becomes how to work with these changes and foster an environment of
innovation and competition for banks, which enables banks to provide the best
services and products to their customers. 255
C. Possible Competition in Laxity; Race to the Bottom
The charter switching phenomena of the early 2000's started a debate over
the desirability of revisions to federal preemption rules and whether national bank
regulators can properly protect customers' interests.
As a result of conversions to a national charter, the OCC's supervision over
assets has grown tremendously. 256 In the late 1990's, the agency oversaw banks
with about $2.5 trillion of assets, 257 accounting for more than 58 percent of the
nation's banking assets. 258 In 2005, the agency's responsibility was almost $5
trillion; including $662 billion from the JP Morgan Chase switch and $119 billion
from the HSBC switch. 259 In 2005, among the ten largest retail banks in the
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nation, SunTrust is the only bank, which has a state charter. 260
The OCC prepared itself in advance for the influx of charter conversions.
For example, the agency's New York office has about 60 on-site examiners
specialized in derivatives and other specialty products. 261 As the OCC's Senior
Deputy Comptroller, Douglas W. Roeder, said "We [the OCC] haven't had to
disrupt and shut down and stop everything in a crisis mode . . . I take confidence
from the fact that the process is probably set up the right way and certainly can
benefit from evolving." 262
Faced with an avalanche of federal regulatory requirements, particularly with
regard to large size nationally chartered banks, the OCC did not hesitate to
continue the increase of its examiners. As Deputy Comptroller Roeder stated: "We
[the OCC] try to get people early in their career life, train them as fundamental
examiners, and then introduce them to larger banks ... That's still our bread and
butter". 263 The OCC also provided an advance cash payment of $75,000 for
examiners who were willing to relocate to its New York office. 264 Due to shortage
of staff, the OCC went as far as hiring examiners from other banks and Wall
Street. 265 Deputy Comptroller Roeder confirmed this trend when he stated:
"We complement the homegrown examiner with someone off the Street who
doesn't necessarily need the learning curve on the technical side and can help us
gain momentum, around the pace of how some of these businesses move ...
Certainly within the regulatory community, word gets out. People do recognize that
266
there are opportunities, particularly in New York, for experienced examiners".

Accordingly, the OCC and the New York State Banking Department began
competing for employees. The New York State Banking Department's examiners
267
have, thus far, "resisted" any temptation to join the OCC's New York office.
From a regulatory point of view, a main focus of the OCC's work has turned
to the credit card business. Almost 70% of credit card assets in the U.S. banking
system are under the national charter. This concentration presents challenges
beyond the OCC's traditional risk analysis. 268
Consider the OCC's position on preemption: the agency claims that part of
its responsibility concerns consumer protection. Although nationally chartered
Jan. 28, 2005.
2 See SunTrust Banks, Inc., http://www.aboutus.org/SunTrust.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
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banks assure the OCC that they have put everything in place to ensure that the
banks' employees behave ethically, reality indicates that many workers do not
meet that standard. 269 Breaches in risk control at banks have occurred because
bank employees were stimulated by their bank employers to make a quick dollar or
build a business without fundamental risk monitoring in place. 270 Even the OCC
by its own admission accepts the fact that it does not have enough human expertise
to supervise compliance by the nationally chartered banks. 271
State bank regulators, such as the New York State Banking Department, in
order to remain competitive with the OCC, are revising and improving their
policies in connection with state chartered banks. However, not everything is
going smoothly. As a result of departures of many banks from state bank
supervision, state regulators have been forced to increase assessments fees on the
mortgage brokers, mortgage banks, check cashers, money transmitters, and other
financial companies these state agencies examine. 272
As one example, the New York State Banking Department has decided to
charge every financial company based on time spent and resources devoted to its
examination. 273 State chartered banks are less than thrilled with this decision.
Some of these banks express their "mood" openly. William McGarry, the President
and CEO of Ridgewood Savings Bank, a New York chartered thrift, warned that
there could be more conversions to national charters, if the State Banking
Department increases fees on state chartered banks. He said: "If costs were to run
amok, they [New York State Banking Department] might suffer more
defections." 274
Choice of charter is a delicate topic for federal and state bank regulators due
to their competition in supervising banks. In the early 2000s, competition and
occasional enmity between national and state bank regulators increased sharply. 275
The OCC's preemption rules issued in January 2004 prompted state bank
regulators to argue that the heavy-handed approach of the OCC could leave
consumers unprotected. 276 On the other hand, banks were known to go from the
OCC to state regulators in order to escape aspects of consumer protection. 277
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A few banks, due to pressure from regulators, have abandoned their initial
strategy to switch charters. For instance, in February 2000, National Commerce
Financial Corporation (national charter) announced its switch to a state charter,
causing Comptroller of the Currency, John D. Hawke, to visit the bank's Memphis
office where he may have attempted to persuade executives of the bank to remain a
national bank. 278 Logically, as expected, the OCC denied making any such
intervention. 279 As John W. Ryan, the executive vice president of the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors, said, the OCC always seem to be "extremely
aggressive" in promoting the national charter. 280 He added, "They [the OCC] very
heavily market the charter to the largest institutions. They cherry pick." 281
State bank regulators have expressed concern about the threat of the OCC's
preemption rules posed to the dual banking system. 282 State agencies see
significant structural differences between state and national charters. 283 They add
that Congress should take action in such regard. 284
Congress has tried to stimulate debate about the OCC's preemption rules and
their effects in the dual banking system. For instance, in late 2004, Senator John
Edwards introduced a resolution, which would overturn the OCC's preemption
rules. 285 Eliot Spitzer, then the New York Attorney General, has been a vocal
opponent of the OCC's preemption rights towards state bank authorities
concerning state lending, licensing, and consumer protection laws. 286 The legal
counsel at the Oklahoma State Banking Department, in criticizing the OCC's
preemption rules said, "the OCC's standard for preemption has been built on a
political platform for the promotion of its charter." 287
Former Comptroller of Currency, John D. Hawke, Jr., has been one of the
staunchest advocates concerning the increasing power of the national chartered
banks under the leadership of the OCC. Another former Comptroller of the
Currency, Eugene A. Ludwig, while speaking about Comptroller Hawke, said that:
What has happened during his [John D. Hawke, Jr.'s] term, which has dramatically
changed the national banking system, is the number of conversions . . . which
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284See Davenport, supra note 245, at 1.
2 See National Treasury Employee Union, Senate Banking Committee Scrutinizes, Questions
OCC Preemption Rule, http://www.nteu274www.nteu274.org/preempt.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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affirms the predominance of the comptroller's job as the linchpin for supervision of
the banking system. For good or ill, the fact is that during his time, as a result of
conversions, there will be a huge preponderance of the banking assets of the United
28 8
States regulated by the comptroller's office.

The OCC has openly criticized the state banking system in the race between
national and state bank agencies to charter more banks. Particularly, the OCC
claims that while state bank regulators often proclaim that state banking is a
"laboratory of innovation," these regulators have mostly become, as a necessary
consequence of the laws described in this article, copycats of federal practice. 289
However, from time to time, federal bank authorities, namely the Fed, the
FDIC, and the OCC, have tried to cooperate with state bank regulators in order to
harmonize adequate operation of the banking system, both at the state and national
level. 290 As a director of banking relations at the OCC said: "We [the OCC] have
missed the opportunity to work together in the past" with state bank regulators. 291
He added: "We think the banking industry needs us both." 292 One suspects that
there is a measure of disingenuousness in the observation.
Prior to the OCC's preemption rules, state bank regulators were attracting
more and more national banks to state charter. 293 There is evidence that the OCC
issued the more vigorous preemption rules to protect its remaining major national
banks or attract new banks. 294 In Oklahoma there are almost 185 state chartered
and 90 national chartered banks. 295 Between 2000 and 2004, 23 national banks
switched to a state charter; conversely, during the same period, no state bank
switched to a national charter. 296
During the period 1994 through 1998, assets under national chartered banks
increased 45 percent (equal to $3.2 trillion), and the assets held by state chartered
banks climbed 28 percent (equal to $2.2 trillion). 297 For the same period, almost
179 state banks switched to national charters and about 156 national banks
converted to state charters. 298 We see roughly equivalent charter movement in
both directions.
2
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In the year 2005, there were almost 6,200 state chartered banks, while
approximately 1,800 were under national charter. 299 Also, since around mid-1980s
about 55 percent of all bank's assets were held by national chartered, increasing
dramatically between the period 2003 through 2005 to 64 percent of assets. 3oo
Some banks switch from a national to state charter because they expect
easier access to, and quicker responses from, state bank regulators. 301 While these
banks have similar powers to national banks, they get additional powers from state
regulators. As a high state banking official said, "We [the Oklahoma State
Banking Department] have started pointing out the difference between national and
30 2
state banks . . . and that has created new interest in the state charter."

The FDIC, federal spokesman for state non-member banks and logically a
leading spokesman for the state chartering system, has expressed concern that the
OCC's preemption rules are putting state banks at a competitive disadvantage. 303
As a result, in 2005 the FDIC was considering holding a public hearing on a
petition filed by the Financial Service Roundtable, which asked the agency to offer
a type of preemption for state chartered banks. 30 The petition requested the FDIC
to issue a rule giving state chartered banks that branch into another state the same
exemption from the host state's laws that national banks have. 305 Officials on the
roundtable claim that the presented plan would provide parity and serve like a wild
card for state banks, which would have similar rights to compete in other states as
national banks. 306
The FDIC's intervention in the preemption matter could be explained as the
agency's effort to level the playing field. In other words, if the FDIC would grant
parity to what the OCC has done, then the FDIC would essentially have a total
preemption of state laws with regard to all FDIC-insured institutions. 307 In such
case, the question becomes how much would be left for the states? 30s
Neil Milner, President of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, is one of
the most vocal advocates in favor of state bank rights. He argues that in order for
state bank regulators to have more banks under their jurisdictions, they should
offer lower fees than those of national regulators. 309 Otherwise, complaining about
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unfairness on the part of national regulators will not improve anything. Mr. Milner
says that "[i]t's OK for states to solicit national banks, and it's all right for
Comptroller Hawke to solicit state banks for a national charter." 310
In the competition for banks, an ill-chosen word can have the same
incendiary effect it will have in a competition for votes. We will assume that a
rational bank will generally select a regulator who is more agreeable, easier to
work with. Is this the same thing as a 'race to the bottom,' a search for a regulator
who is less inclined to enforce restrictive laws? If so, the concept of dual banking
can be regarded as a dangerous structure.311 If we look again at the situation
described above where the Marine Midland Banks switched its state charter to
federal supervision in order to obtain approval for a sale of stock to a Hong Kong
bank, this might be interpreted as a needed regulatory change or, conversely, as a
race to the bottom type search for the more lenient regulator. 312 One cannot be
categorical about this. Occasionally we do see what looks like a race to the
bottom, as when First Bank and Trust in Brookings, South Dakota, switched from
a national to a state charter in order to make payday loans only to be met
subsequently by an objection to the lending pattern by the state authorities. 313
One's judgment may be based in large part upon one's political philosophy. In
general, however, we are not inclined to see a general offering of leniency by
either federal or state regulators as a blandishment to adopt their charters. 314
Federal and state bank regulators will undoubtedly continue to compete for a
bigger share of the banking business. The agencies cannot be faulted in competing
for banks. The more banks under the respective agency's supervision, the more
power the agency will obtain and the more vitality will exist in the system.

IV.

DE-FACTO END OF DUAL BANKING SYSTEM - ESSENTIAL IDENTITY OF STATE
AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

A. Variations but Essential Identityfrom the State Wild CardStatutes
State "wild card" statutes have as their common goal the ultimate grant of
authority to state banks to do anything that federally chartered banks are authorized
to do.315 They exist in 47 states.316 Sometimes the grant occurs automatically;
310
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sometimes it requires enabling state action. 317 Most "wild card" laws do not
automatically grant state banks increased powers without some further action by
some local state authority-typically the commissioner of banking. 318 This officer
will review the potential increase in authority and determine whether it is
consistent with the desired standards of local banking.319 State legislators
developed the "wild card" approach to make state banks competitive as well as to
allow state legislators to save time and effort in amending their banking laws,
when and if required. 320 It is, however, incontestable that the wild card laws move
state banks closer to national banks and consequently reduce the difference
321
between the state and national banking systems.
Though some out-of-state banks may not be covered by a given "wild card"
statute, 322 a host state banking regulator may have discretion to provide substantive
parity for out-of-state banks when operating under its home state law. 323 The host
state regulator might permit out-of-state banks to carry on activities subject to the
charters of their home state laws. Through this type of device and the evolution of
modem interstate branching laws, state bank charters will necessarily have a broad,
not infrequently national, effect. 324
The home-state banking regulators of interstate banks, under multi-state
supervisory and regulatory agreements and in order to provide the maximum parity
with national banks for a state bank, are the primary regulators for all multi-state
banks. 325
Host-state banking regulators, on the other hand, may be
correspondingly disposed to permit home state banking laws to obtain parity with
federal banks. 326
Because it is to their advantage, the banking industry on the state level
continuously supports legislation to extend the provisions of states' "wild card"
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laws.327 Such legislation grants state banking broad authority to maintain parity
with national chartered banks. 328 Such legislation also provides authority for the
state banking authorities to seek the same parity for the state's thrift institutions. 329
A state's banking industry is composed largely of local and regional banks to
which have been added since enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Act in 1992 branches of banks with home offices in other states. When
aggregated, these banks represent substantial assets. For example, in 2007, the
state of New York had almost $5 trillion of state banks assets and more than
300,000 New York employees. 330 State banking agencies constantly amend
existing state laws or add new ones in order to meet the needs of their banks and to
keep up with the expanding powers of the national banks. 331 Without such an
approach to new legislation, charters of state banks might fail to keep pace with the
powers of national banks, ultimately threatening the existence of a viable state
bank system. It turns out, however, that the "wild card" device-while designed to
enhance the power of the state banks-has the effect of unifying and consequently,
ending the dual banking system.
In the last decade or so, the states banking departments have gone "wild" in
passing "wild card" legislation. By 2006, 47 states had enacted some form of
"wild card" law. 332
In order to remain competitive, state authorities have become innovative in
their efforts. In the interstate branching context, state regulators work to secure
some of the natural advantages that accrue to national banks. 333 Acknowledging
that national banks would likely be capable of operating under a single set of rules
when branching interstate, state banking regulators obtain "parity" laws, providing
that host state laws would apply to local branches of out-of-state state banks only
to the same extent they would apply to an out-of-state national bank.334 State
banking authorities also acknowledge that interstate branching might be faced with
the need to deal with multiple state regulators. 335 As federal-chartered banks
327 See Tom Johnson, Bank Charter Commission Eyes 'Wild Card' Law, Code Upgrading,
THE
DAILY RECORD, Oct. 22, 1997.
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report solely to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, state banking
regulators have reached an understanding among themselves that the home state
banking supervisors have the basic responsibility for supervising the interstate
branches of their banks.336
Further, state banking regulators are seeking robust federal banking
legislation, which would define the respective powers and responsibilities of
home-state regulators and host-state regulators pertaining to the supervision of
state banks branching interstate. 337 In other words, states are looking to sort out
their respective state banking laws by looking at the approach taken in the federal
arena. 338
Occasionally, in the course of implementation, "wild card" provisions
conflict with existing state banking laws. For example, in New Jersey, there is a
debate over a bank's right to charge mortgage prepayment penalties. 339 Banks and
thrifts may not always be eager to exercise their new powers because of varying
interpretations of "wild card" laws legislation. Banks in New Jersey say they
could put themselves at a disadvantage by using the "wild card" laws to charge
pre-payment penalties, which are illegal in the state. 340 New Jersey and several
other states have long banned pre-payment penalties. 341 However, when New
Jersey passed "wild card" laws (in 2000), banks and thrifts had the option to join
federally chartered thrifts in imposing pre-payment penalties. 342
Taking into consideration such lawsuits filed by consumers challenging the
mortgage pre-payment penalties imposed by the New Jersey banks, 343 the New
Jersey Division of Banking ruled that although New Jersey laws have a general
prohibition on pre-payment penalties, "state-chartered depositories may impose a
reasonable pre-payment penalty in the same manner that their federal counterparts

Reserve Bd. of Governors), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
kohn2006030la.html.
336 See Edward J. Kane, De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?,
28 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 141, 143-46 (1996).
" See Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and
Politics ofthe Relaxation ofBank Branching Restrictions, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1437, 1437-67 (1999).
3
See Carter H. Golembe, History Offers Some Clues on Significance of Interstate Branching, 13
Banking Pol'y Rep. 4, 4 (1994).
33 See Ben Jackson, Why State Banks Pass on Wild Card; Banking Legislation, 168 AMERICAN
BANKER I (Aug. 5, 2008).
340 See Sam Ali, Federal Rules Take Precedence on Some Prepayment Fees, STAR-LEDGER, May
27, 2004.
34 See Court: Prepay Penalties Are Legal in NJ, ORIGINATION NEWS, July, 2004.
342 See Ali, supra note 340.
343 See Glukowski v. Equity One, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 1, 9-12 (2003).. The New Jersey Banking
Association sought clarification about the conflict between state laws and "wild card laws" in mortgage
pre-payment penalty. Id The association filed a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of a mortgage
company, which was sued for charging a S1,400 mortgage prepayment penalty. Id at 10. The plaintiff
was Mark Glukowski, who in 1999 received a loan from Equity One Inc. of Marlton, New Jersey,
which had a balloon payment in 2009. Id. at 9. In 2001, Mr. Glukowski sold the property and paid off
the mortgage but was assessed a 2% fee on the principal balance of the loan. Id at 10. The plaintiff
argued the prepayment fees was in breach of New Jersey law, but a Law Division judge dismissed the
case, saying that federal law preempted state law. Id. The New Jersey Appellate Court found,
however, that there was no federal preemption. Id at 12.
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do." 344
Most of the state bank regulators give state-chartered banks, but not state
thrifts, permission to do whatever federal banks can do. 345 Some state legislators,
such as New York, are looking into ways to make the state's "wild card"
provisions automatic, so that such banks would not have to file an application to
obtain the same powers as national banks. 346 That New York intended to eliminate
the differences between state and national banks through its "wild card" is
demonstrated by the State Senate memorandum, which begins "The bill is
designed to provide parity to State-chartered banks and trust companies, vis-A-vis
national banks." 347
Illinois is one of approximately 20 states, which under the "wild card"
provisions permits both the state thrifts and state banks to enter activities similar to
federally chartered banks or thrifts. 348 Bankers in the state said that the "wild
card" law levels the playing field between state and national banks. 349 For
example, Paul A. Pogue, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the North
Adams State Bank in Ursa (Illinois) said "banks in more competitive markets will
probably take advantage of the . . . ["wild card"] law first. I'm sure some will
jump at this. I look at it as being good for banking," he added.350
The state of Illinois' banking agency, under the "wild card" law, retained the
right to prohibit banks from conducting an activity believed to be "unsafe,"
therefore making the law ambiguous. 351
Under its "wild card" law, the Illinois state banking regulators have brought
state -chartered banks closer to identity with national banks by according them new
powers under the state's "wild card" law including the right to offer credit analysis,
real estate appraisal, bill collection, and title insurance. 352 Scott D. Clarke,
Assistant Commissioner of Banks and Real Estate of Illinois said: "This provides
an excellent opportunity for state-chartered banks. They [state banks] want to
provide the widest number of products to remain competitive." 353 What Illinois
did, however, was reduce the vigor of the dual banking system.
Mississippi also has "wild card" law. 354 Reflecting on a Mississippi state
344 See Jackson, supra note 339.
345 See Prepared Testimony of James L. Pledger American Council of State Savings Supervisors

Texas Savings and Loan Commissioner Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, June 25, 1998.
346 See Damian Paletta, New York State Superintendent of Banks Diana Taylor; Dick Kovacevich,
Wells Fargo & Co.,, 170 AM. BANKER 3 No. 14 (Jan. 21, 2005).
34 See 1997 McKinney's Session Laws of New York 1998.
348 See Bill Barnhart & Tim Franklin, Thompson Backs Regional Banking Bill, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12,
1985.
3 See Tim Franklin, Interstate Banking Bill Okd By House Committee, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1987.
35o See Laura Pavlenko Lutton, Eye on the States: Illinois Gives 'Super Wild Card' Powers to its
State-CharteredBanks and Thrifts, 163 AM. BANKER 8, No. 165(Aug.19, 1998).
3
See Scott Barancik, 164 Illinois Lowers Bar For New Activities At Its Banks 2, AM. BANKER,
No. I53 (Aug. I1, 1999).
352 See Alan J. Greiman, A Formulafor Illinois Banking, CHI. TRIB,, June 15, 1985.
3
See Laura Pavlenko Lutton, Eye On the States: Illinois Gives 'Super Wild Card' Powers To Its
State-CharteredBanks and Thrifts, 165 AM. BANKER 8, No. 165 (Aug. 19, 1998).
354 See Chris Casteel, Ruling Gives Bank Room to Branch, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 29, 1999.
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court's finding on state-chartered banks' rights to sell insurance products, George
Dale, the Commissioner of the State's Insurance, said that the state has a "parity"
law that gives state banks an equal footing with national banks. 355 Kathleen W.
Collins, counsel for the Financial Institutions Insurance Association of Mississippi,
a trade group advocating banks' right to sell insurance, said that "most states are
not going to disadvantage their state banks. If they did many more state banks
would apply for national charters." 356
In 1998, the Nebraska banking commissioner was the next state regulator to
win "wild card" authority from his state legislature. 357 By then, forty-one banking
commissioners had already implemented "wild card" laws. 358 Nebraska's banking
trade associations actively supported "wild card" law.359 Kurt T. Yost, the
executive vice president of the Nebraska Independent Bankers Association, said:
"It ["wild card" law] makes life easier for the state's banks. It's just a process that
streamlines things." 360
In summer of 1997, the New York State Banking Department, one of the
largest and most active state banking regulators in the country, adopted permanent
regulations based on the provisions of a "wild card" banking bill, which passed in
the last hours of the state legislative session. 361 The "wild card" law, which
permitted state-chartered banks to sell insurance, was the last bill approved for the
session by the New York lawmakers, who, for the record, almost killed the bill, as
the session of the State Assembly was near closing. 362
The New York "wild card" law passed with one major change from the
accord achieved between banking and insurance industries. That was that the
"wild card" law contains a one-year sunset. 363 The sunset could have been
extended or shed, while the State Banking Department emerged with regulations,
which would have been permanent, and built upon the "wild card" law.364
According to the New York Bankers Association, the State Banking Department,
unlike the Insurance Department, obtained authority to approve the new activities
and products for state-chartered banks under the "wild card" law, which
established the state banks' parity with national banks. 365
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O'd Moore, National Banks Face Battles with State Regulators, 163 AM. BANKER
10, No. 204(Oct. 13, 1998).
35 See Laura Pavlenko Lutton, Nebraska Bill to Expand Bank Powers Advances, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 17, 1999.
35. See Laura Pavienko Lutton, Nebraska May Be in Line to Give Agency 'Wild Card' Authority on
Charters, 163 AM. BANKER 2, No. 225 (Nov. 24, 1998)
3 Id.
36 Lutton, supra note 358.
361 See New York Banking Bill Passes with One-Year Sunset, 10 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
WATCH 1, No. 32 (Aug. I1, 1997).
362 The day of the closing of the New York State Assembly's session was August 4, 1997.
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NATIONAL
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In summer 1998, a year after the initial "wild card" law, George E. Pataki,
Governor of New York State, signed a two-year extension of the existing "wild
card" statute. 366 The statute empowered the State Banking Department to allow
state banks to enter into new banking activities as long as those activities were
permitted under a federal charter. 367 The extension of the "wild card" statute was
attained in part due to the persuasion of the New York bank regulators, who
warned the state legislators that, if the state failed to extend the statute, most of the
180 state-chartered banks would switch to federal charter. 368 In 1998 eight of New
York's ten largest banks held state charters. 369 Facing the risk of losing business
within the state, Governor Pataki said: "My [New York State] administration was
determined to do everything in its power to assist state-chartered institutions in
their quest to compete with banks regulated by the Comptroller of the
Currency"." 370 What New York achieved, however, was a narrowing of the
difference between state and national banks.
In 2000, the New York State legislators again extended the "wild card"
statute for two years. 371 The extension of the statute reflected the state regulator's
continuing fear of losing state-chartered banks to national-chartered bank
regulator(s) (the OCC).372
Before the existing "wild card" statute expired in 2003, New York legislators
passed a bill, signed by Governor Pataki into law, further extending New York's
"wild card" statute for an additional four years. 373 This law now covers state
thrifts. 374
Since creation of a comprehensive "wild card" statute, the New York
Superintendent of Banking has promoted and sustained regulations to further the
comparability of state and national banks. 375 As the President of the State Bankers
Association testified in a speech to the State Assembly, the statute has given the
Banking Department "the authority to grant parity to state banks . . . our
comprehensive wild card law allows the Banking Superintendent to foster
regulations to ensure a 'level playing field' for all State-chartered banking
institutions with national banks." 376 In trying to ensure the survival of the state

366 See

supra note 285.
See New York Bankers Association Applauds Extension of 'Wild Card', PR NEWSWIRE, June
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372 See supra note 393.
3
See Crain's New York Business, Aug.4, 2003, at 10.
3 See id.
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Assembly%20preemption.html

2008

Is THERE A DUAL BANKING SYSTEM?

71

banks, the legislature has in actuality provided the formula for their end.
In the late 1990's, the state of Wisconsin also passed a "wild card" law. 377
William D. Brouse, President and Chief Executive of the Wisconsin League, said:
"As things kept going in Washington [D.C.], we said we should at least do what
we can to protect state banks and thrifts in Wisconsin"." 378 Under Wisconsin's
"wild card" provisions, state-chartered banks would be required to obtain
379
permission to offer the same products and services as national banks.
Wisconsin is one of many states working to revise its charter to conform to
national banks as federal deregulation continues. The Wisconsin statute most
closely resembles the universal charter Maine created in 1997.380 All statechartered banks, savings banks, and thrifts in Maine have now equal powers. 381
In various states there has been a tendency by legislators to strip state bank
regulator's authority over "wild card" laws. For example, in early 1998, the
Kansas state banking regulator fought fiercely with the state senate to prevent
Senator Steffes' proposal to eliminate the banking commissioner's "wild card"
authority. 382 Under a commissioner's order in 1995, state banks were permitted to
create subsidiaries to invest in tax-exempt government securities. 383 The Senator
384
argued the move cost the treasury of the state of Kansas millions in tax revenue.
This legislation proposal faced swift prevention efforts from the state's Banking
Commissioner, who said that if legislators take authority over "wild card" statutes
away from the commissioner's office, "every state bank in Kansas would switch to
a national charter. Then the Legislature would have no control over banks in this
state." 385 The Conference of State Bank Supervisors immediately reacted and
stated that such action was the equivalent of "shooting a mosquito with cannon." 386
387
Fortunately, the bill never passed the Senate floor.
In conclusion, "wild card" statutes, while on their surface enabling statechartered banks the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with federally
chartered banks, have had the effect of reducing the differences between those two
classes of banks leaving us with essentially one, not a dual, banking system.
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B. The Federal Deposit Insurance CorporationAct of 1991
The activities of state banks are allowed only to the extent permitted by
section 24 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
("FDICIA").388 Section 24 requires state-chartered banks to apply to the FDIC for
permission to carry out state authorized activities beyond those granted by
federally chartered banks. 389 Section 24 does not apply to agency activities. 390
In the first years after enactment, implementation of Section 24 by state
banks proved cumbersome. This is not because the FDIC denied applications to
these banks. 391 The truth of the matter is that applications filed with the FDIC took
tremendous amounts of time getting through the bureaucratic system established to
review applications. 392 Further, the approvals involved only "innocuous practices"
of no particular concern to either the state or the national systems. 393
With time, the FDIC improved its practice of handling state-banks'
applications for "expanded" activities. 394 Bankers at the state banking level
expressed optimism about the innovative role the Act provided to state-chartered
banks. For example, Neil Milner, the President and Chief-Executive-Officer of the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors said "Modernization in our banking system
has come from the state level . . . Section 24 has had a stifling effect on state

innovations. Our citizens and the banking industry have suffered for it. These new
rules encourage banks and states to innovate, while making sure the Bank
Insurance Fund is safe." 395
Among state banking regulators there is a belief that restrictions on banking
activities of the state-chartered banks, as provided under Section 24, seem to
unduly interfere with the authority states traditionally exercised over their
banks. 396 Since inception, the Act was expected to greatly reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden on state-chartered banks, making it much easier for statechartered banks to enter into banking activities allowed under state law. 397
Nevertheless, since its inception and despite promulgation of the newer
regulations, the FDIC has continued on its "innocuous" road and has approved
nothing that might dynamize the state banking system. 398 Along with the "wild

3ss Id.
3
390
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See OCC Inter. Letter 742 (Aug. 19, 1996), 1996 WL 544203.
id.
in fact, the FDIC approved the vast majority of the applications filed by state banks.
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card" statutes, Sec. 24 of FDICIA has had the ultimate effect of unifying the state
and the federal banking systems. 399
Consistent with the homogenization of state and national banks, FDICIA
Section 24 has given the FDIC authority over out-of-state state bank branches as
well as branches in the state under consideration. 400 The FDIC has attempted to
establish complete and clear guidance on the application of home state law to
interstate branches of state banks. 401 The role of states as a "laboratory of
innovation" in banking may thus ultimately be seen as presently governed by the
FDIC under FDICIA section 24.402
According to a 2002 speech by the FDIC Chairman, "applications reviewed
by the FDIC have not been in the category of what you'd call pushing the
envelope." 403 Most of the state bank-applicants have requested FDIC authority to
invest in securities or to conduct real estate investment and development. 404 And
the bulk of those activities were essentially continuations of non-controversial
activities begun before enactment of FDICIA. 405
C. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Applies Equally to State and FederalBank Holding
Companies
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA") 406 aims at modernization of the
financial services industry by removing regulatory barriers established in the postDepression period of the 1930's. The Act permits banks, through their financial
holding company structures, to engage in a series of new activities, including
insurance and securities underwriting activities. 407

399 See Anne M. Taylor, The FDIC's Enhanced Powers Over Savings Associations: Does Firrea
Make it "Saif"?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 381.
400See Marie T. Reilly, The FDIC as Holder in Due Course: Some Law and Economics, 1992

COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 165 (1992).
401 See 12 U.S.C. 183
1aj).
402 See David G. Sorrell, Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Banking & Fin., S Testimony at the Public Hearing
on Preemption Petition before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Board of Directors, (May 24,
2005) available at http://www.fdic.gov/ at Conferences & Events Section at http://www.fdic.gov/news/
conferences/agency/publicsorrell-test.htmL.
403 See Don Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May 30, 2002) available at http://www.fdic.gov (under
Speeches, Testimony & Articles Section) at http://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/archives/2002/
sp30may02.html. The FDIC has approved the requests of some banks to carry out activities, which are
somehow unusual. Id. For example, in 1994 on bank received the federal agency's approval to
purchase a business, which tests personality characteristics and leadership skills. Id. Also, in 1994
another bank received approval from the agency to engage through its subsidiaries in the business of
printing services and in the production of microfilm. Id. In 1996, another bank got the agency's
permission to acquire a subsidiary with only one non-cash asset, a steel mold used in the process of
bending and installing cable wire. Id.
40'See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1539 (2007).
"0sSee Patrick J. Burke, Should Banks be Permitted to Engage in Real Estate Brokerage and
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Under the provisions of the GLBA, commercial banks, insurance companies
and securities firms are able to affiliate or merge among themselves, activities that
were highly restricted under pre-GLBA law. 408 The GLBA accomplishes this goal
by formation of the financial holding company structure ("FHC"), whose
subsidiaries may carry out activities, which are either "financial" in nature,
409
"incidental" to such activities or "complementary" to a financial activity.
The GLBA allows firms which control banks and that meet certain
regulatory requirements to become FHCs and to create non-banking
subsidiaries. 410 By March 2000, there were almost 150 state and federal bank
holding companies ("BHC") authorized by the Federal Reserve Board to become
FHCs. 411 By 2003, the number of BHCs electing to become FHCs was
approximately 630.412
The GLBA's treatment of state banks is essentially comparable to its
treatment of national banks.413 Under the GLBA, there is no longer any reason to
believe that things will be done differently at the state banking or holding company
level as contrasted with the federal level; nor is there a relative benefit in selecting
a national or a state charter. 414 Here again the traditional dual banking system may
be said to be inoperative.
The Federal Reserve Board is the overall supervisor for bank holding
companies and for the GLB-created FHCs.415 There is no regulatory distinction
416
between a holding company created within the federal or the state systems.
Under its "streamlined" supervision, the Fed focuses on the consolidated risk
position of the entire holding company while relying on information from
417
supervisors of its components.
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With appropriate state permission, state banks may engage in those activities
allowed to financial subsidiaries of national banks. 418 Yet to be sorted out is the
extent to which the FDIC may continue to permit state banks, authorized by state
law, to engage in principal activities under Section 24 of the FDIC without being
subject to any of the GLBA restrictions imposed on "financial subsidiaries."4 19
Our conclusion is that the Bank Holding Company Act (as amended several
times most importantly by Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999) is itself an argument
against the dual banking system in that it treats national and state banks in
essentially the same manner. 420
V.

SUPPORTS FOR DUAL BANKING SYSTEM

A. In restricting state bank activities to those authorized for national banks,
the restriction of FDICIA applies only to the state activities conducted as
principal-not as an agent. 421 It thus leaves such agency activities as selling
insurance untouched. 422 As a first comment, however, the ability to conduct
business as an agent seems too weak a reed to support the massive dual banking
system. There is just not enough there to justify the structure. 423
It does have some validity, however, since agency businesses may be
conducted in state banks outside FDICIA and unaffected by FDICIA. 424 In other
words, it is only through use of the dual banking system that banks could conduct
such businesses at all. 425
This argument had vitality up to the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act in 1999. Indeed, substantial and flourishing agency businesses were created
despite FDICIA in 1992.426 However, upon enactment of GLB in 1999, the
agency dual banking prop largely disappeared. 427 The invention of the financial

. See Susan Schmidt Bies, Remarks by Susan Schmidt Bies,, 37 CONN. L. REV. 715 (2005).
419 See John B Beaty & Ronald R. Glancz, FinancialInstitutions Options,
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421 See Michael P. Malloy, Financial Services Regulation: A Mid-Decade Review: Colloquium:
Double, Double Toil and Trouble: Bank Regulatory Policy at Mid-Decade, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 2031
(1995)
422 See Gilbert, supra note
401.
423 See Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, Banking and
Insurance: Before and After the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723 (2000)
424 See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, U.S. Restructuring Legislation: Revising
the InternationalBanking
Act of 1978. For the Worse?, 60 Fordham Int'l L. J. 507, 537 (1992)
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holding company in GLB with its newly-permissible businesses left the business of
banking-or, more accurately in light of GLB-financial institutions, vastly
expanded. 428 One cannot now find an agency-based business that cannot be
conducted in a financial holding company whose basic power is to conduct any
business that is "financially related." 429
B. There is a circular argument that supports the dual banking system
because it is there. There are, after all, national banks and national regulators and
state banks with their regulators. This is the system in place. It entitles banks to
move from one regulator to another more or less at will and based upon
perceptions of current need. Upon consideration, it appears, however, that this is
not a justification for a system, but rather the use of a system. Wherever there are
two individuals (or entities) doing a job there may be some rationale for going
from one to another. Indeed, inside either the national or state systems now, one
can move from control by Mr. X in one state to Ms. Y in another. That one may be
more cooperative than the other does provide a reason for the move, but it is not a
reason for a system putting more than one regulator at a client's disposal.
If we reconsider the Marine Midland Banks situation430 we observe a state
bank taking a national charter because the state banking superintendent was not
cooperative.431 How do we know, however, that if it perchance had started as a
national bank it would not have had an uncooperative federal regulator to be
junked in favor of the state equivalent. 432 Would we justify two SECs or FCCs so
that a regulated entity could switch from one regulator to another? That is,
433
however, what is frequently said in favor of the banking system.
C. We have mentioned the power of the FDIC to approve state bank
activities beyond those of national banks under FDICIA when the FDIC judges
that the FDIC "has determined that the activity would pose no significant risk to
the appropriate deposit insurance fund; and .. . the State bank is, and continues to
be, in compliance with applicable capital standards." 434 We have also mentioned
how the FDIC has moved very slowly and cautiously in the exercise of this
function. 435 It has commented upon this itself.436 In no way can the FDIC's
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428 See Michael S. Bylsma, Financial Modernization: What's In It For Local Communities?,
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(2001).
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snail's pace in approving expanded activities be considered the justification for a
parallel banking system. 437
The FDIC's approval of applications for state bank authority to exceed a
national bank's authority under Sec. 24 of FDICIA may be read at the FDIC
website under "Regulations & Examinations>Laws & Regulations>Decisions on
Bank Applications." 438 There are several dozen of these approvals. Many of them
deal with the continuation of authorities granted or assumed before passage of
FDICIA. 439 Some deal with the authority to develop a specific piece of real estate
acquired adjacent to the bank premises before authority was a problem. 44 0 A
number themselves limited by firewall limitations and restrictions that assure the
limited authority granted. 441 They all deal with minor and limited issues of law
and could not be seen as the nascence of a dual banking system. 442
To get an idea of this pattern, some decisions randomly chosen are
summarized here. They are designed to show by example that the conduct of
business beyond that allowed to national banks does not sustain a second banking
system. 443
In re: S& T Bank Indiana, Pennsylvania.444 Approval was granted to (i)
invest through a wholly-owned subsidiary in stock of Pennsylvania trust
companies, bank holding companies; savings associations and savings and loan
holding companies and (ii) to retain stock in out-of-state bank holding companies
which represent an investment originally made in a Pennsylvania institution but
which, through merger, became an institution outside Pennsylvania. 445 Six
firewalls restrain the investment. 446 One provides that there shall be no further
investment in the subsidiary without the approval of the FDIC regional director. 447
BarretvilleBank & Trust Company, Barretville, Tennessee.448 Approval was

granted for the bank to continue to hold an equity investment previously acquire
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through a to-be-established wholly-owned subsidiary. 449
Seven Maine Banks.450 Approval was granted for seven Maine banks to
acquire through majority owned subsidiaries a three percentminority interest in a
private mortgage reinsurance company organized under the laws of the Turks
Caicos Islands, British West Indies. 451
Central Carolina Bank and Trust Company Durham, North Carolina.452
Approval was granted for the Durham bank to hold all the stock in Sprunt
Insurance Company to be organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.
Sprun will sell only reinsurance. 453 Six firewalls include the requirement that
Sprunt be operated in accordance with law.454 The FDIC will retain the ability to
assess the impact of Sprunt's operations on the state bank. 455
First State Bank of Pineville, Kentucky. 456 The bank entered into a guaranty
agreement before enactment of FDICIA. 457 Approval was given to continuation of
the guaranty. 458
Mutual Savings Bank Milwaukee, Wisconsin.459 Land contiguous to the head
office of the bank was purchased before enactment of FDICIA.460 One lot was to
be held for use in future expansion. 461 The bank received approval to hold the
remaining property in order to conduct an orderly distribution. 462
Vt.

THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM SHOULD BE ENDED DE JURE As WELL As DE
FACTO

A. Great Simplification at No Real Price
We have attempted to demonstrate that, despite its presence in the printed
word, in the process of employment and the formation of associations, there is no
realistic dual banking system in existence. Where a concept so loses its function, it
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makes good sense to provide for its dejure in addition to its de facto end.
Bankers complain regularly about the unnecessary complexity of the
regulatory system but do not seem to appreciate that turning the so-called dual
system into a single regulatory approach to banking can yield obvious
simplifications the price for which has already been spent. 463
It is strange that there is no proposal along these lines. One would expect
committee hearings to be held in Washington and conferences held among bankers
to explore the idea. We believe these should occur.
B. A FederalSystem Would Be a Better System
We need not take sides on which would be the better system, national or
state. Undoubtedly a certain political timorousness at even addressing this
question has made discussion in Washington unlikely. We do believe, however,
that a single national banking system would be preferable. Banks are, of course,
growing larger and covering more states. Legal considerations affecting them
would be simpler and more apparent if we had a single juridical approach. The
artificial boundaries of the states would no longer present a confusion of
overlapping laws together with the need to apply them to banks both large and
small.
No one wants to commit economic suicide and we can anticipate a fierce
resistance from the state banking authorities (and perhaps the national authority
too) at even considering the issue, let alone resolving it.
C. State Representatives Can Continue to Represent Consumers without a
Dual Banking System
We began this article with a description of an argument currently being
waged over issues of preemption in consumer representation. 46 We observed that
the dual banking system is being forced into the argument without good reason.
The allocation of responsibility for consumer protection between state and national
authorities will continue to exist-and there will probably be arguments about its
proper placement -whether or not there is dual banking. 465 Consumer protection at
the state level does not depend upon a state banking system. 466 State officials
committed to the protection of their consumers will continue to exist whether or
467
not there is a state banking system. The two are not interdependent.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The dual banking system is an illusion. It is both expensive and useless.
This should be recognized and the dual system reduced to one.

